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I have to admit that the topic of this book is one that only
began to interest me recently. That was during a month-long
visit to the USA at the time of the President’s decision to go to
war in Iraq. I was told on television that he was ‘comfortable’
with that momentous decision. So, it seems, were most
Americans, on and off television. Pick-up trucks boasted the
Stars and Stripes, ‘God Bless America’ was everywhere, and
you could almost see the flag in some television journalists’
eyes. But many Americans were not comfortable. These
included low-income homesteaders, who displayed banners
saying money should be spent not on war but on want. Most
of my colleagues were against. Some of them confronted a
curious dilemma. Those with plans to spend the summer
vacation in France risked reprisals, even among colleagues;
those bent on Italy could stick to their plans with easy minds.
One thought that struck me at the time, too trivial in the
light of such events to dwell on for long, but inescapable for
the well-brought-up philosopher, was this: if the US public is
divided on the invasion of Iraq, how can we still think of it as
‘the’ US public? Divide a public, as anything else, and you
have not one but two. But do we not, even when the US public
is divided, still say that what is divided is the US public? This
public, like any similar one, somehow survives division, this







publics, or a thousand publics. So what is this notion of ‘the’
public that stands fast though it is divided?
Other more urgent thoughts occurred to me. The way in
which the media, especially television, ran up the flag was
one of these. When some rusty cans were discovered by the
advancing armada, an excited commentator on a well-known
television channel exclaimed that now, surely, it would be
‘game, set and match!’. That the press was also divided is true,
but critics were mainly confined to the printed word and had
to wait a long time before television, in its characteristically
vivid manner, began to carry evidence that things were not
going all that well. Both the power of the media and the ease
with which people were influenced by them caused me to
ponder for the first time the nature of the democracy that
exists in our modern western societies. Is it really good
enough for us to think of exporting it?
There are two opposite ways of looking at our modern
version of participatory democracy. One way is to see it as the
expression of an ideal in which responsibility for generating
good in the world is laid on the shoulders of the individual
rather than the state. That would provide an ideological basis
for the actual nature of a society where privacy is so privil-
eged and protected. The privacy can then be seen as an
opportunity for fulfilling human possibilities in the way these
have been traditionally regarded, that is to say, as essentially
involving the capacity to cooperate and create equitable forms
of coexistence.
But there is a more depressing view. It is that any opportun-
ities for fulfilment on this basis are being increasingly forfeited.
That (by no means new) thought underlies and motivates this
book. The chapters that follow attempt to indicate and explain






direction that I think might provide us with an opportunity
nevertheless to exploit to human advantage the privileging of
privacy.
Our topic is the public but its point of view is that of the
public as we know it, or think we do, a public in which, for
good or ill, the media play a major role. However, to be clear
about the present it helps to look into the past. By, as it were,
bouncing our topic and its subtopics back from their past, we
are able to see them all from a wider and a deeper perspective.
The past, after all, is where habits of speech have their origin,
and changing circumstances along the way do not always find
their expression in current idiom.
Chapter 1 suggests that our public is not quite the ‘public’
that our ways of talking about ourselves would lead us to
assume. Since that is due largely to the way our society has
departed from the one in which our inherited notion had its
origins, and in order to locate that origin and highlight the
features that were incorporated in it, we deepen the focus and
go back to ancient Rome to look at a society that had yet to
acquire the feature whose presence our ways of talking tend
to assume.
How far, and in what way, has our society departed from
the one in which the notion of ‘the public’ first arose?
Chapter 2 returns again to the past, first to the virtual past of
Shakespearian history and then to the actual past of the
eighteenth century, where another notion, that of ‘a public’,
the public as audience, began to gain ground and to be con-
fused with that of ‘the public’.
As an illustration of this confusion, we can turn to some
current images familiar to us from the media. Media images
reach a wide public. That at least is how we often put it, and






atrocities disclosed in Abu Ghraib prison was ‘worldwide’. By
‘worldwide’ we often just mean ‘across national boundaries’.
But, of course, with CNN and its colleagues there are no
serious limits to the distribution of such images. It seems
perfectly in order, then, to speak of CNN’s audience as its
worldwide public. The distinction made in Chapter 2 helps
us, however, to be clear that while the notion of ‘the public’ is
political, that of ‘a’ public is only incidentally so.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 look at the present in the light of the
past. The ideal of a public sphere, a sphere of open and free
discussion, arose in the eighteenth century, in ways that have
been well recounted by others. Chapter 3 re-tells the history
in short form in order to show how, even within the fledgling
public sphere, this other notion, that of ‘a’ public, had found
a secure footing and with it the distinction between speaking
authority and listening public. Chapter 4 teases out the notion
of public opinion through visits to Hume and Voltaire. With
some notions now of the public, of publics, of the public
sphere and of public opinion to back it, Chapter 5 takes a
direct look at the present; but even here there is a brief
allusion to the past. The topic is that of the takeover of
public space by privacy, of what that means, and of the impli-
cations for participation by the public in political affairs.
Chapter 6 follows with some account of the role in this of the
media.
The remainder of the book offers suggestions for staying
the damaging effects of the circumstances addressed so far.
Chapter 7 promotes a form of common sense in the shape of
an ability to detect anomalies both in the utterances of people
with the power to direct events and in those who willingly
follow their lead. Among these latter we, as often as not, find






is that there is an alternative to the objectivist proposals
typically advanced by philosophers. A case is paraded for an
individual’s perspective, though not in abstraction but one
born of experience.
In writing this book I have drawn on what has been said on
these matters from the time of Cicero. So there is nothing new.
But I do try to bring together strands that challenge readers
to judge, and at more than one level, some not unfamiliar
criticisms of western society. My aim, then, is to offer a
critical as well as a descriptive account of what the public
amounts to today, and to supply enough in the way of sugges-
tions and arguments to engage the critical faculties of readers,
whatever their own views, or whatever conclusions they








This book began life in a comfortable easy chair in the sitting
room of a peaceful home loaned by a friend in California. As I
began taking notes, I watched US tanks speeding invincibly
towards Baghdad, cheered on by patriotic journalists. For the
chair, the home and the peace I thank Marianne McDonald, as
also for kindly sending me a book that did much to speed me
on my own way. Andrew Feenberg I thank for sharing his
wide knowledge of communications literature, and some
thoughts on pianos, even before I began; Marit Bakke for a
valuable tip on literature; and Brit Berggreen for more of the
same and for many an idea. I owe to Arne Johan Vetlesen’s
acute observations on an early draft a sharpened sense that
not all will agree with me. To all of these I can express my
appreciation without implicating them in anything they
might take exception to in the result. Not so with three
anonymous reviewers. Their discerning comments have been
quite indispensable in producing the final draft. If mistakes
and obscurity remain, blame me. I owe to my publisher, Tony
Bruce, special thanks for heading me in the required direction














We hear and read a lot about the public these days. In the
media, the public appears as an important player in national
and international politics. If not exactly in the front line, the
public is nevertheless presented as a force that political
decision-makers must reckon with. Putting drastic plans into
effect can depend on a wave of its support, while when events
take an unpredicted turn, the politicians may find that it has
become their scourge. In the wake of the invasion of Iraq,
claims that governments had misled the public about the
justification for war littered the press. There is a moral dimen-
sion too: ‘The British public won’t forgive such shameless
scape-goating’, said one newspaper article, referring to the
British government’s accusation that the BBC had lied when
claiming the government had ‘sexed up’ the information at its
disposal to make a more convincing case for war.1 Yet, when
the tumult dies down, the public often shows itself able to
forgive. Or should that not be, rather, to forget?
In spite of its place in the press, we may wonder whether
the public proves to be anything like a thing or even personage
at all, as opposed to the more or less tangible things we call
‘public’ (affairs, services, officials, spirit, to say nothing of
holidays, parks, baths, libraries, schools, and houses)? After









singular noun ‘private’, only an adjectivally private this that
and the other. Still, however intangible this public may prove
to be, according to our ordinary ways of speaking we may
nevertheless side with it, and it with us. We can sometimes
dissent from it, but also offend and outrage it. That seems to
show there must be something we can identify as its opinion.
But what exactly is public opinion? A kind of collective view
of things perhaps, the view people at large have concerning
issues of common concern? How can or does the public
acquire opinions? Where does it meet? Who draws up its
agenda? Furthermore, even if on occasion the public may
speak with one voice, that is far from being the rule. That
public opinion is frequently split suggests we must dig
deeper, or perhaps ascend to some higher and more abstract
level, to catch sight of what is meant when we refer to the
public.
To ask ‘what is the public?’ sounds as if we were asking for
features of some abstract object, or trying to pin down the
public on a chart of ‘kinds’. The question sounds abstruse and
philosophical. A question apparently far easier to answer
would be, ‘just who are the public?’, for then we can point to
each other and say, ‘you and I are the public’ as, for that
matter, is anyone. But as we will see, that answer, if true,
although scarcely informative enough at first glance for the
question to be worth asking, is in fact highly significant. It is
also rather complex, but seeing the complexity will put us
then in a position to ask that first question in a somewhat
different way. We will be able to ask both ‘what is the public?’
and ‘what became of it?’.
That first question, ‘what is the public?’, at least has the
virtue of capturing the idea we have, at least in our own and









not always a single body then at least a diffuse source of
sometimes conflicting views on this and that – views that
make the headlines, but which, as we shall discuss, it is not
implausible to suggest that the headlines also help to make.
For the present, we are looking at something else. That the
public figures quite naturally in our thoughts tends to obscure
certain truths about the topic and about our society. Although
ordinary ways of speaking might suggest otherwise, the fact
that you or I are members of the public does not mean that
the public as we think and speak of it is to be found just
anywhere. Did Roman citizens form a public? Was there ever
an Iraqi public? What about present-day China? If the inclin-
ation is to answer ‘yes’ we may ask ourselves whether the use
of ‘public’ in these cases really does have the same flavour, or
whether the same associations really come to mind, as when
we speak of the British or the American public, of the French,
the German, etc. But if we say ‘no’, can we say with any
certainty just what was missing and what changes would be,
or in the case of the Romans would have been, required for
such states to acquire their public?
Although by no means an abstruse exercise, perhaps the
present attempt to throw light on the notion of the public
may still be called philosophical. But then that is because
any investigation into some not very obvious or indeed nor-
mally considered but central fact deserves the name. That the
public figures quite naturally in our thoughts of our own
society, that it is a kind of public figure, is a fact that conceals
many less immediately accessible facts about the society, its
distinctiveness, its possibilities and also its alternatives.
The expression ‘members of the public’, used just now, is
a common one, but it is also rather curious. The idea of







which the public explicitly has no access. The sign ‘Members
Only’, although addressed to the public, to the majority of
the public means ‘Keep Out’. But what form of association
is being appealed to when a television commentator tells
us that along with ‘sixteen members of the Royal Family’, ‘a
thousand members of the public’ attended the commemorative
celebrations of the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II?
Several questions offer themselves to reflection. What form
of membership can apply both to the former and to the latter?
Can, and on what terms can, the members of each join with
those of the other to form a single public on that occasion?
Consider how reflection on this matter might proceed. To
begin with, we might think, all that membership of the public
means is entitlement to move freely in what is called public
space, in this case one of those spaces where members of the
public join together in celebration. In others they assemble as
an audience; perhaps in the presence of royalty, members of
the ‘ordinary’ public tend to form an audience. In other public
spaces, they are merely there. In general, public spaces are
where you find the public. The freedom to be there is enjoyed
by anyone ‘belonging’ to it.
Yet what sense of ‘belonging’ together is there in just being
able to run across one another in places ‘open to the public’?
As a way of belonging, membership brings to mind ties that
link a number of people. These may be the kind of internal
and contractual bonds shared by members of a club, or a
team, or some other form of association such as families,
including royal families. They can be blood ties or ties of
convention, or they may be rules one subscribes to in return
for commitment to some common aim, whether the pursuit
of some esoteric interest or an interest pursued in public, for









teams formed by football clubs compete under the rules of
membership of a more embracing association for prizes such
as the League Cup.
It is difficult to uncover any such basis underlying the title
‘member of the public’. It is more difficult even than with the
notion of ‘member of the human race’. There is underlying
the latter at least some taxonomical point in marking us off as
belonging to one species rather than another. Though the
etymology is more complicated,2 the customary distinction
made by ‘public’ is with ‘private’, and that is a socio-political
and, especially, a juridical distinction. Moreover, even if we
talk of the private domain there is nothing called ‘the’ private
of which you or I, or even some non-personal entity, might
be listed as a member.
In the case of the purely taxonomical distinction, there can,
on occasion, be something stronger and more existential than
just the need to mark one species off from another. The pro-
spect of universal extinction, for example. Consider imminent
environmental disaster or a predicted collision with an asteroid
on course for Earth. We may readily understand how the
threat of collective annihilation and the thought of its tragic
implications and the need to face up to them can give members
of the species a sense of global belonging, a sense of the kind
we capture in phrases like ‘all in the same boat’. But could
there be a parallel scenario, making global membership of
the public an equally possible notion? Might we, in certain
circumstances, see ourselves as members of a universal
public?
Although it may seem easy enough to envisage a universal
public, in the sense of a collective to be part of which implies
no geographical or national identity (it is indeed one of the







see how being a part of that collective can be described in
terms of membership. Some people claim that globalization
strengthens rather than weakens national identities, just as it is
claimed that a centrally regulated European Union will be
able to protect the integrity of its component states. Like
Europeans, universal citizens can still think of themselves as
members of their nations, as of whatever other associations
are available. It does seem more likely, however, that the idea
of nation-membership, by becoming increasingly abstract,
will tend to merge in importance, as well as have to compete,
with other more dominant associative forms. In the context of
the nation we are more likely to talk, whether appropriately
or not, of being part of its public, which is expressed ‘at
home’ by saying we are (part of ) the public.
But of membership of that public? Well, as noted, the expres-
sion is one that springs naturally to the lips. In anticipation of,
but also by way of introducing a main line of thought in what
follows, we can reflect on one kind of situation that brings the
expression as it were into its own. If inclusion in the public
means, as I suggest there is good reason to think it does, being
accorded some entitlement to state protection, then situations
in which that entitlement is invoked can very well induce a
sense of membership. It is a sense analogous to that in which
subscribers to health schemes or rescue services are referred
to as members of, say, Blue Cross. Just as illness activates the
notion of this membership, so can a dramatic threat to the
nation bring the contractual implications of citizenship into
play. Even if those party to such an implicit contract have
never deliberately entered into such a thing, its virtual exist-
ence and what the state, established as it has been to protect its
citizens, owes to ‘the public’ as a whole becomes an issue









overtones in the way US citizens responded to the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001. The response can be read in
other ways too and in less intellectual terms. There are latent
ideas of membership in the history and well-disseminated
heritage that US citizens are brought up to share, providing a
broader background of latent membership ties that invoke
shared nationhood on the analogy of the close ties of family
rather than underwritten agreement. Either way, we can get a
sense of what it is to feel that one is a member of a public, of a
particular public.
Much of what I shall say about the public in this book is
negative. But the negativity is of several sorts, not all of it bad.
Thus there is no denying that there are many virtues in the
fact that there are societies of which it is appropriate to say, as
in the case of our own, that people living in them form their
public. For reasons that will become clear, it is not appropriate
to say that in respect of tribal or theocratic societies, that is,
societies whose historical course and whose values are deter-
mined by monarchical traditions and stringent religious
doctrine. The reasons are those that explain the special nature
of what it is for us to be or form a ‘public’, however that term
may be used in other contexts. Nor does the notion of the
public properly apply in a police state, whether secular or
theocratic. The point, crucially, is that a public in the sense in
question must somehow be made up of individuals properly
called ‘private’, and that assumes that they are not under mili-
tary law or a tyranny. One may, under such conditions, still
speak in a derivative way of the public; for instance, of a
public kept under a tyrant’s thumb. But in that case it is not a
functioning public, the ‘membership’ is not, or is no longer,
active. On the other hand, and tellingly in respect of what has







just such conditions that a sense of actual membership, of
sharing something in common, comes to the fore.
As for the negative things I shall say about the public, they
are not attempts to defend tyranny or reinstate theocracy.
They are directed at the idea itself and what is to be regarded
as its highly significant lack of content. They are also directed,
later in the discussion, at the damaging effect the notion has
when made the cornerstone of political life. It is damaging
because, as many writers have pointed out, the public is
largely a myth. That myth is still with us and has now begun
to appear in the guise of a global public. One conclusion
I shall draw from the anomalous nature of the notion of
membership of the public is that the less we have reason to
talk of a global public, the better. Briefly, for the conditions to
become global under which there is a single public, certain
wide-ranging changes in the social and cultural ordering of
human life would have to be in place. These could be disas-
trous. From the human point of view it might mean the
extinction of the humanity of the human race.
But let us approach this apocalyptic conclusion carefully.
First, we need to become clear about how the word ‘public’
has been and is used. It was in currency long before the liberal
politics that made such expressions as ‘public opinion’ and
more lately ‘the public sphere’ current. This may make us
sceptical about what was just claimed, that the notion of
the public belongs to secular societies, or modern societies,
societies run on principles first promulgated in the Age of
Enlightenment. Has what is called ‘the public’ changed all that
much in the course of history? And surely we ourselves use
the term in a far wider way than this arbitrary confinement of
it to modern secular societies suggests. Doesn’t history itself









Regarding the confinement of the notion to modern society,
that has something to do with how this notion is connected
to two others: that of the public sphere just mentioned, a
social space in which views can be publicly aired and matters
of public concern openly discussed and debated, and that of a
public opinion, as a voice made audible in that space.
As for what history can tell us about all three notions, we
may begin by looking at history itself. Well, not directly. The
example is historical but we know it best in Shakespeare’s
fictional version in Julius Caesar. Mark Antony speaks in the
market-place to what are referred to in the play as ‘citizens’.
He does so just after Caesar is assassinated by the conspirators.
According to Shakespeare’s source, the Greek biographer
and philosopher Plutarch, Mark Antony was giving the
‘customary’ funeral oration. The custom was that such ora-
tions be given in the market-place. Naturally, since that is
where ‘the people’ were. Plutarch continues:
. . . perceiving the people to be infinitely affected with what he
had said, he began to mingle with his praises language of
commiseration, and horror at what had happened, and, as he
was ending his speech, he took the under-clothes of the
dead, and held them up, showing them stains of blood and the
holes of the many stabs, calling those that had done this act
villains and bloody murderers.
‘The people’, says Plutarch, were ‘excited . . . to such indigna-
tion, that they would not defer the funeral, but, making a pile
of tables and forms in the very market-place, set fire to it; and
every one, taking a brand, ran to the conspirators’ houses, to
attack them’.3
Might not Plutarch equally have said it was the public that







public that Mark Antony knew he would meet in the forum
and that he aroused to action?
With an important proviso, to be followed up in the next
chapter, about how in another sense Mark Antony’s audience
is rightly referred to as a public, it will, I think, become clear
that to say either of these things would be incorrect.
Etymology is not always, is indeed perhaps seldom, a safe
guide to the meanings of words as currently used. But in the
cases of ‘people’ and ‘public’ it is illuminating for our own
discussion to see how, even if we nowadays tend to use these
words interchangeably, any actual convergence of their mean-
ings is really a meeting of ideas from opposite corners of the
political landscape.
The Latin word populus is closely linked to nationhood. It
refers to a people, or from within the bounds of a nation, to
the, or its, people. But in Roman times the term acquired
chiefly political connotations and the people were often identi-
fied as those who actually participated in national assemblies
and spoke for the nation. In the Roman constitution, the
powers of government were divided between senate, magis-
trates and ‘the people’. Assemblies in which the latter partici-
pated were appropriately called ‘popular’, but participation
was at first confined to the nobility (patricii), it therefore being
the latter – to us it will appear strangely – who were identified
as ‘the people’. Only when commoners (plebeii) came to be
included in the assemblies, in the course of what must count
as the most democratic legislative arrangements to appear in
ancient Rome (somewhere in the fourth century ), did ‘the
people’ begin to acquire something of the sense of plebs, ‘the
common citizens’, and then inevitably in certain contexts,










Just as much a political term as populus, the Latin publicus
referred to other aspects of Rome’s political life. What was
public was what was shared and open to view. One thing
shared was, naturally enough, an interest in the maintenance
of that large protective entity, the state. This was the prime
concern of government, in which, as we saw, the people were
involved to various degrees and in various guises. Derived
from this is our notion of ‘public affairs’, or res publica, which,
construed in the singular as in Cicero’s dialogue De re publica,
was used to refer to the state, or commonwealth, in general.
In Latin the term res included the sense of ‘property’, so that
res publica would have the sense of things that everyone had
some investment in and some power over. The idea of the
state, not just as a body politic, but also, or perhaps rather
included in it, as a shared property in which all have an interest
and also an ear, if not always a voice, is just what our own
concept of a commonwealth is intended to capture. In Roman
times possession and use of res in general was part of the
people’s freedom and a source of civic satisfaction, while loss
of it in times of dictatorship could lead to a revolt of the
masses and their seizure of power. In Cicero’s dialogue a
nation run in the name of the people would no longer be a res
publica but a res populi.4
Not all debate on public affairs was itself public in the sense
of being open to view. The senate’s meetings were closed.
Nor were popular assemblies necessarily public in the way
that, say, senatorial hearings in the United States are today, or
sittings of the House of Commons. ‘Public’ in this sense
would refer to those events, political or otherwise, to which
the people had access as spectators. Whatever debates, trials,
to say nothing of spectacles and ‘circuses’ of the kind pre-







auditor’s sense, there is no basis here for saying that those
who witnessed these were members of the public. The
Roman experience gives us no sense yet of what such a pub-
lic, as opposed to the ‘people’ in a sense similar to that of the
‘commons’ (who were indeed represented), might be to
whom or to which these proceedings could be open. Least of
all does it give us a sense of how the public, again as opposed
to the people, might take an active part in political affairs.
That Mark Antony spoke in the market-place was no
coincidence. In Rome, as also in ancient Greece, the forum
(or agora respectively) was originally just a market-place (at
least in so far as any market-place can be just that), only later
becoming a centre of civic activity. This was the natural venue
for the greatest gatherings, and business transactions would
take place there as a matter of course. It was a place where
people could exchange gossip and views as well as goods, and
flock to hear the latest rumours. They could catch sight of
those who decided the course of political events. Not least the
latter could make themselves visible there and get some sense
of the strength of support for their projects or of the different
factions among the people. In some obvious senses, as well as
in some less obvious, the Roman forum was thus a public
space. And the political role played by those who gathered
there, outside the senate, the courts and assemblies, was vital
in many ways, even if it was only a supporting one. The
people’s support was important enough, since its weight in
sheer numbers was needed for the carrying out of policies.
That was particularly true at the time of the events Plutarch
recounts. Up to then ‘the voice of the people’ (vox populi) only
counted when it spoke in the name of the popular assemblies,
however these were constituted. But as Mark Antony









made in Roman society had largely been reversed by the very
man whose death occasioned the speech. Now, more than
previously, it was only in the forum that the voice of the
people could make itself heard, and if once made up only of
patricians, the people were now the populace. From the point
of view of the current patricians, however, listening to that
voice was necessary if they were to know which way the wind
was blowing, if only to be ready to make it blow in another
direction, should that be necessary. Disaffection, if wide-
spread, would be a hindrance to the recruitment of willing
armies and to effecting political change at home. Shakespeare
has Mark Antony beg those assembled to lend him their ears.5
Not, be it noted, as free individuals with protected areas of
privacy before whom he, former tribune of the plebs, now
triumvir (custodian of the public peace), and would-be
successor to Julius Caesar, must put his own case, but so that
by bending their minds he could seek support for the succes-
sion. Thus it was that once he sensed the effect his words had
already made upon those assembled, Mark Antony seized the
opportunity and (through, in Shakespeare’s rendition, a
superb piece of crowd manipulation) turned them into
incendiarists.
As we noted, Shakespeare identifies the members of the
audience as citizens. Rightly. The civil status of Civis Romanus
had been instituted as a title with rights attached. In the time
of the republic it applied to all free inhabitants of Italy but was
later extended to all members of the Roman Empire. The title
had a powerful symbolic value that brought peoples with
different backgrounds into a far-flung fellowship. Its embody-
ing actual rights that protected the individual certainly helped
in this respect, for instance the right not to be interrogated by







could only be cast in Rome, while those between seventeen
and sixty were always liable to military service, usually well
away from the capital. In a world lacking our modern means
of communication, citizenship therefore meant very little
politically. What it did was provide members of an extensive
empire with a strong sense of superiority through shared
membership of something of supreme value, just as soldiers
are inspired to loyalty through indoctrination into a cele-
brated (often noisily as well as visibly) heroic tradition. If the
historical Marcus Antonius addressed his audience in any-
thing like the conciliatory manner of Shakespeare’s version,
that audience need have detected nothing patronizing or
manipulative in ‘Friends, Romans, countrymen’. They would
appreciate the directness and Mark Antony could count on the
sense of a shared destiny behind this appreciation. It was a
given that his rhetoric could exploit.
Suppose we now move forward in time to the Roman
forum of today. There it is, full of tourists, some in groups
together with their guides, and ice-water sellers, all mingling
in the ruins of the market-place, the very place where, going
on 2000 years ago, Mark Antony addressed his fellow
Romans. There is a bomb scare and the carabinieri arrive in
force to clear the area. A stentorian voice comes over the bull
horn, ‘Will the public please leave as quickly as possible’, the
same request repeated in several languages. They leave, while
various custodians of the peace remain. Why might we feel
this form of address appropriate in this situation?
We note first how general it is. It makes no national distinc-
tion. By the same token, no account is taken of whatever
political identities those addressed possess in their native
contexts. If at home they would form part of their nation’s









These are simply individuals with the economic resources
required of people exercising their rights to traverse a foreign
piece of public ground. For the tourist, a visit to the forum is
just one aspect, a fringe benefit as it were, of being the kind of
ubiquitously mobile private citizen that characterizes modern
societies. The forum is part of a space within which such
infinitely mobile individuals can freely move.
This answer might indicate a simple way of identifying
‘members’ of the public. We could say that it is simply by
virtue of occupancy of this or any other particular public
location that such ‘membership’ is earned. After all, even
when we have dispersed, and so long as we do not enter
private houses unasked or public offices outside opening
hours, or places where ‘public’ affairs are being conducted in
camera, we are still occupying some portion of public space.
Why then should not occupancy of any such space be what
makes it appropriate to collect us under this general term
‘the public’? We cease being identifiable as members of the
public once we have returned to our hotel rooms, or more
emphatically perhaps when we finally arrive home and close
our garden gates or front doors.
But the answer and the identification are defective and also
misleading. Though physical public space is where you meet
the public and become it, the notion of space that defines the
modern public is abstract and more complex than examples
such as the forum as a tourist attraction can provide. What
that particular example does show is that, in contexts such as
this, with an ‘invasion’ of tourists, the anonymity of the public
extends also to national anonymity, thus obscuring the way in
which the notion of the public is a political one and tied to
‘membership’ of some identifiable body politic. But there are







We can throw light on them by introducing a general
notion of public space in the abstract and more complex sense
we need. That will allow us to see how the public’s occupancy
of such a space differs both from other ways of occupying it
and from its time-to-time occupancy of such sheerly physical
locations as streets, pedestrian precincts, public gardens, art
galleries, sports stadiums and other spaces reserved for ‘the
public’.
In its more abstract sense the term ‘public space’ indicates
the presence and possession of shared knowledge and inter-
ests. Although the interests people share are far from being
exclusively political, it is through the idea of the public good
served by political and public life that a public space acquires
its prime etymological right to the title ‘public’. Yes, we can
say that soccer fans occupy a public space in something like
this sense, as opposed to the stadiums themselves, but in
saying it we are merely acknowledging that a large number of
people know who is who and what is what in the now-
international world of soccer. Basically, there is a public space
in the wide, or secondary, sense wherever there is a topic of
conversation that can be focused on by several individuals.
Normally, the focus will be on something visible or audible
or both, the Roman forum or an opera performance for
instance, or, for mathematicians and micro-physicists the
notions manifested in significant marks on paper or a black-
board. Usually, the shared interests forming the public spaces
people inhabit lead them to occupy parts of sheerly physical
public space too. But even the very occupying of such
spaces can be what forms a public space in this other sense.
Inhabitants of a city or village or a piece of countryside
occupy geographically bounded areas but in doing so they









them: buildings, sights, landscapes, personalities and so on,
all of which form backgrounds to their lives. The notion of
space here is clearly metaphorical; it is shorthand for a notion
that would have to be analysed in terms of a demography of
shared beliefs, interests and topics.
But to occupy a public space more properly so-called is to
share with others an ability to identify political leaders and
public figures; it is to know and relate to those responsible to
you as a ‘member’ of the public whose interests a govern-
ment claims to serve. It is to know these figures in at least the
quasi-personal way that journalism and the media in general
make possible nowadays. It is to share much besides, into the
bargain; but, increasingly, the other interests people share,
interests outside their own political allegiances, are becoming
shared across political boundaries. Those they share in their
own political situations form a special kind of ambience, a
sense of belonging, of sheltering as it were under a common
political umbrella. What binds you under its protection, a
protection that is as much psychological, because identity-
forming, as political, to whatever extent it succeeds in being
the latter at all, is a familiarity with the names and reputations
of the main players responsible for the social conditions in
which you live.
Returning now to those tourists, we can say that in the
typical case only a few will share ambiences. Some will even
be at a loss, though less surprisingly perhaps than in some
other countries, to label the government or name the prime
minister of the country they are visiting. Even if the whole
world knows of a Berlusconi, it is at least typical of Europeans
to know less of the politics of neighbouring and near-
neighbouring countries than of that of their own. By contrast,







least as much cultural diversity as Europe, to describe US
citizens as inhabitants of a single public space appears more
plausible. The forces that keep the American ambience
umbrella largely intact are complex, but the existence of a
powerful and centralized press corps must be one of these.
The ability to present a unified picture of the state of national
affairs is a strong tool of government. There are other forces at
work too, but we will return to these later.
Our tourists, then, are not ‘the public’. We did hint that
there is nevertheless a sense in which they are ‘a’ public. That,
too, is something to which we will return. Here we need to
recall that the people who flocked to the ancient forum in
Rome were not ‘the public’ either. What then is it we, or any
of our tourists, must possess that they lacked to qualify for
that label? Just what does it take to inhabit a public space,
properly speaking, in a way that allows us to say that in
inhabiting it we are ‘its public’?
Well, you may ask, didn’t the Romans share knowledge and
interests in the way we described, the way that defines a public
space? Surely they did. They knew their leaders, they had a
strong sense of shared identity, and they were listened to; in
matters of war and succession it was impossible for the elite
to conduct affairs in ways of which the populace did not
approve. So why can we not call them the Roman public?
We may think, provisionally, of the presence of a public in
the modern sense of the word as requiring the presence of
two things absent in ancient societies. We have already hinted
at one. Today the good of the community is thought of
primarily in terms of the good of its individual members, the
private citizenry, and of their descendants; and the indi-
viduals themselves must be thought of as each having a say in









and how to maintain it. What is meant by that somewhat
misleading term ‘member of the public’ is a matter of a
person’s being considered a free and rational being. The free-
dom in question is not just an entitlement to occupy public
spaces, or the possibility of sharing a public space, as above,
both of which could be enjoyed by the Roman. It includes the
freedom to influence public debate. In ancient times this
influence depended on the institutions of civic and political
life living alongside the people they served, people on whose
allegiance and support ‘officialdom’ to a large degree
depended. It was a matter of proximity and chance, there was
no political arrangement whereby the individual citizen as
such could have a say, and certainly not wherever geographic-
ally placed. Very few individual members of the nation or
community had an active say in how to deal with public
welfare. Those who did spoke as representatives, but not in
the sense, our sense, of carrying a mandate from an electorate.
These representatives were embodiments of the people, for
political purposes they were the people, while for the repre-
sented there was no other recourse than to join in the chorus
of the vox populi. But that chorus had to be coaxed to exist at all:
it did not naturally speak with one voice. In sum, in Roman
society the collective good was not conceived, as it is in ours,
as the sum of the good of all members of the community
individually. Consideration of the public good was tied
ultimately and directly not to individuals as such but to the
nation and its glory and to the state that maintained both.
Conversely, the good of the individual was subservient to the
glory of the nation and the well-being of the state. The indi-
vidually courageous and powerful would be seen as personifi-
cations of that glory and well-being, just as state spectacles







performance in some literal sense a performance both by and
of the state.
Earlier it was stated that Roman citizenship provided
members of an extensive empire with a sense of superiority
through shared membership in something of supreme value.
The somewhat paradoxical consequence is that there is more
reason to describe the Roman citizens’ relationship to the
state in ‘membership’ terms than there is in the case of ours
to our own. But then there is conversely less reason to
describe their membership as being that of the Roman public.
Although it conceals another side, namely the rights of indi-
vidual privacy, the visible hallmark of the public in our own
day is anonymity. We may make ourselves known in public,
to a public, but when we do that it is to an audience, another
kind of public; it is not a matter of one member of the public
making itself known to another or to others. The stereotypes
of the public today include the rush-hour throng and the
Saturday afternoon football crowd. Not even a composition of
units or atoms, this public is an amorphous nothing into
which individuals merge. It is, of course, easy to imagine
groupings of individuals drawn from this public, samples of
the public grouped under several headings: patients in a wait-
ing room, travellers at a boarding gate, spectators at a football
match. These can be counted, indeed they usually are, but the
labels themselves tell us we are no longer talking about the
public. We are talking about private citizens going about their
several activities. The term ‘the public’ is not itself a label of
that kind. There is no characteristic activity or set of activities
that sets you off as an instance of the public. At best these
labelled groupings are formed by members of the public, but
we have noted the difficulty with this notion of membership.









that you might imagine being assembled in a vast reservoir
from which these other groupings draw.
We can exploit the reservoir analogy. Logicians distinguish
a count-noun from a mass-noun. In drawing water for a
drink, what you enjoy is a drink of water. You may enjoy
several. But water itself is neither one nor two; it is some-
thing, the same thing, that you encounter each time you draw
water from a tap. When buying a woollen jersey you choose
among several, so ‘jersey’ is a count-noun, but at the same
time, in testing its quality, you are in touch with wool as
such, as against cotton or acrylic fibre. So too with the public;
you need just one sample to have it in view. By arriving at the
actual number of societies that have a public, you will of
course be able to say there are so many publics, and in this
‘public’ differs from ‘water’. For every one of those societies,
however, there is just one and anyone is it.
The point of saying ‘the public’ in a political context, how-
ever, is not to indicate the truism that in each state that has a
public there is only one. The distinction is a theoretical or
organizational one, within a state, that distinguishes one
political category from others. In this perspective it is not at
all hard to speak of the public as some quasi-tangible thing,
for instance as that body to which political and public life
is responsible. Still, it is a strange kind of body. If someone
says to you, ‘Show me this public of yours’, it would be
misguided as well as misleading to say, ‘I can’t, there are just
too many to collect in one place’. The impracticability of
assembling all those to whom political life in a given state or
commonwealth is responsible, so as to catch a panoptic sight
of them, is not to the point. Your questioner should be satis-
fied by your directing his or her attention to the window and







about the public as such than that you tend to meet it in
public places or nature reserves and the like. If the time of day
and the speed with which passers-by proceed indicate to you
that these are not Sunday strollers but commuters on the way
to work, then that tells you what these individuals are up to,
not what some part of the public is doing.
A person appears as a ‘member’ of the public in the guise not
of ‘someone’ but of ‘anyone’. In the modern world it is
within the protected boundaries of one’s privacy that one can
be, or fail to be, in any fundamental sense someone. One aspect
of the anonymity that overtakes one when identifiable merely
as one of the public is the protection it provides to the private
citizen. It is a kind of incognito, a burkha behind which the
someone one is remains a secret. Considered ‘in itself ’ the
public is faceless, amorphous. In its appearances, as we
encounter it, the public is a more or less arbitrary, context-
dependent sampling of private individuals abstracted from
their privacy.
Yet, according to its official origins this is only half of the
story. Or rather, it is the outcome of a development that offers
materials for a fuller story, that of the public’s rise and fall.
Historically, rather than as an incognito to hide behind, the
public was once a badge which citizens were proud to bear
and eager to show. The public formed a recognizable political
grouping whose members recognized each other as such over
and above their status as private citizens. Indeed the two
would be seen to go together. The public originally formed
itself in order to create and protect the conditions of private
citizenship. The story is a plausible one at least in the case of a
settler nation such as the USA, where the emergence of a
public able to call itself ‘the public’ need not be left to the









American philosopher John Dewey proposes a ‘generic’
hypothesis on the origins of ‘the public’, that is, for any such
public in the American context. The public arose, he claims,
in answer to a demand by ‘a group distinctive enough to
require recognition and a name’. The name they chose was
‘the public’.
This public is organized and made effective by means of
representatives who as guardians of custom, as legislators,
as executives, judges, etc., care for its especial interests by
methods intended to regulate the conjoint actions of
individuals and groups. Then and in so far, association adds to
itself political organization, and something which may be
government comes into being: the public is a political state.7
Dewey defines a ‘state’ as a ‘public articulated and operating
through representative officers’.8 The public thus articulated,
‘consists of all those who are affected by the indirect con-
sequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed
necessary to have those consequences systematically cared
for’. They are cared for by ‘officials’ while representatives
oversee the interests of those of the public who are not in on
any particular transactions. The material property, funds, etc.
needed to undertake this protective role ‘are res publica, the
common-wealth’, while the public thus organized ‘by means
of officials and material agencies’, says Dewey, ‘is the Populus’.9
In the society in which he himself lived, however, this
identity of public and people was no longer a fact, if it ever
had been, for Dewey’s public was based on the idea of quite
small, close-knit communities. He himself says that the prac-
tices and ideas employed in the USA are borrowed from
England and based on the ‘local town-meeting’, while ‘we







and the bonds that tie US citizens are ‘non-political’.10 Dewey
talks of the ‘eclipse’ of the public, but in two ways. On the
one hand he says it is not the case that there is no public, in
the sense of a ‘large body of persons having a common inter-
est in the consequences of social transactions’; on the con-
trary, ‘[t]here is too much public, a public too diffused and
scattered and too intricate in composition’. This presents a
picture of a public too thinly spread to gather itself under one
organization. But Dewey also has another way of saying this.
He says ‘there are too many publics’,11 meaning that, in a
large and ramified modern state, the general formula for a
public can be found to be satisfied by groups within the state,
organizing themselves in the way the public, as the populus,
should, but by their very doing so undermining the possibility
of a public as the populus.
Does this latter threaten the status of our truism, that in
each society that has a public there is only one? Not if the fact
that there are several really does mean that there is no single
public. But even if there were reason to doubt that, the notion
of a public employed in this alternative description of the
eclipse of the public is clearly metaphorical. Just as in speaking
of a state-within-the-state we know we are not talking literally
of a state but of a centre of power and interest isolated from
influence by (though not always from influence upon) the
larger community, so too in talking of publics in the plural
we are not suggesting that a single state could comprise
two or more publics ‘articulated and operating through
representative officers’.
To talk of the public as a phantom, or as a myth, or to refer
to its eclipse, is not to say there is no public. You may rather
put it, in Dewey’s first way, by saying there is ‘too much’









of interest, too much engagement in a diversity of topics,
special worlds, for all these to be brought together into ‘an
integrated whole’.12 Here, in this book, another perspective is
being offered. The public still exists – yes, very much so, for it
is all around us, and we are it. But it is a public that eschews
politics and pursues private interests, it is a public in a new
context, one in which society no longer supports the condi-
tions under which what once was referred to as ‘the public’
came into being. So, if ‘the public’ is an expression we still use
in describing our occupancy of the public spaces we inhabit
today, then its meaning differs from that of the name chosen
for Dewey’s ‘distinctive grouping’. As for his use of the plural
form, in the following chapter we will exploit an alternative
model for talking of publics. It has the advantage over
Dewey’s derivation of the plural form of providing us with an
entirely literal use for the expression ‘public’. How far this
literal use might replace what in Dewey seems clearly to be a









For the provenance of this other use of the noun ‘public’ we
must look to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was
a time that saw the birth and rapid growth of an energetic
middle class, and with it a spawning of a variety of spheres, or
‘worlds’, of interest, commercial, cultural or political, or a
mixture of these. It is here we find our publics. Rather than
trying to grasp them by comparing them with the political
public, as though they were satellite states within the state,
and each public an encapsulated self-ordering population
within the one body politic, we may see them rather as spaces
formed within the state by a proliferation of opportunities for
improvement and the enhancement of life. However, the
appreciation of such opportunities is not always endemic to
those who grasp them; interest often, even typically, has to be
aroused, and that realization makes us reflect on how interests
can be generated and publics created and manipulated. That
thought directs our attention further towards authority, its
influence and its variety.
Let us start by returning once more to Mark Antony and the
Roman forum. There is clearly a sense – and this is the proviso
noted at the beginning of the previous chapter – in which
Mark Antony’s audience in the forum though, as was argued,









In some pedantic sense it would have been that even if his
appeal had been greeted by boos and jeering. Just as the
ruined forum today, by becoming a focus of attention for
tourists, forms the latter in a manner of speaking, and how-
ever transiently, into its public, so too simply by lending him
their ears, those who were present when Mark Antony held
his funeral oration formed his public. But this public became
his also in a stronger and more significant sense. If he first
caught its ear, for which he only had to raise his voice, what
he later held was its mind. Once he ‘perceived’, as Plutarch
has it, that it had become ‘infinitely affected with what he had
said’, this audience was truly ‘his’.
Publics in this sense can be thought of as expandable audi-
ences, though the statistics on knowledge, popularity and
taste tell us that they also shrink. Take the Adam brothers, the
architects Robert and James, who revolutionized their art in
the eighteenth century. They transformed the prevailing
pseudo-classical Palladian style, named after the Italian archi-
tect Andrea Palladio, by developing romantically elegant
variations on diverse classical originals. Commenting on their
own achievements, they wrote: ‘We flatter ourselves we have
been able to seize, with some degree of success, the beautiful
spirit of antiquity, and to transfuse it, with novelty and
variety, through all our numerous works.’ As to whether they
had succeeded, they would leave that ‘to an impartial public’.
As a commentator remarks: ‘In so far as that impartial
public consisted of wealthy patrons in both England and Scot-
land, the answer was resoundingly positive.’1 Narrowly con-
ceived, the Adams’ public consisted only of those who both
liked what they saw and also could afford to buy it. More
widely conceived, however, it consisted and still consists of all












In a still wider context, though more thinly conceived, it has
come to include art historians, ordinary onlookers, or for that
matter, yes, again, tourists. Anyone passing Home House in
London’s Portland Square for the first time and glancing at
that building with approval, or even just discernment, might
be considered a new member of the Adams’ public.
The way in which we talk of buildings, books, plays, their
architects, authors and playwrights, as well as composers,
songwriters and entertainers, having their publics provides a
basis for saying that a public can be more than a mere aggre-
gate of individuals. So one line of thought to be developed
below, not least when we take up the topic of public opinion,
is that the way in which the public shapes an opinion
resembles quite closely that in which aficionados respond to
works of art, or to the work of individual artists, pop groups,
or different kinds of music. A corollary can be offered for our
present context: if in one sense the public shapes an opinion,
in another perhaps not altogether different sense it is the
opinion that forms the public. Combining these is the notion
of an interest. Since interests are diverse we must now be
prepared to talk, as in such a context we do quite naturally,
not just of the public but of a multiplicity of publics.2
This will prove significant in that the notion of public
opinion is commonly thought of as the opinion of a unified
public. There is also, once again, the matter of space. With
these multiple publics the connection with actual public
space becomes merely incidental. If the market interests that
secure artists their publics may motivate a visit to the Tate, or
to Madison Square Garden, or the local youth centre, they can
also bring their clients’ products into the home. Coffee tables
with their art books and a teenager’s den with its CD and









and by the same token they become even a kind of public
space.
Whatever importance this extension of the space occupied
by a public may have for our notions of privacy, amongst
others, we shall not delay to discuss this in detail. There is,
however, one aspect worth noting by way of illustration and
which may lead to further reflections on the sense of ‘public’
here discussed, namely, the effect of technological advances
in the amplification and the recording of sound. Before concert
grand pianos were made possible by building a horizontal
steel frame into a keyboard instrument, the sound that pian-
ists were able to produce carried only to a fairly small group
of listeners placed closely round the performer, and typical
audiences consisted of some patron’s social circle. Before the
harp was provided with hammers to form a keyboard instru-
ment, the audience would have been even smaller. But now,
with the sound able to reach the far end of a large hall, the
privacy of the soirée or palace recital gives way to the public
performance in the concert hall. Later developments have
made it possible to hear performers in vast arenas, but then
equally in the privacy of one’s home, a privacy much greater
than the one in which the whole development began. Note
that in calling the performance now a public one, we are
returning to that other sense of ‘public’ where what is public
is something that may be performed in private but can now
reach the ears of others than those of an inner circle. The
‘public’ that expands in this way is of course a public in the
present second sense, defined by the focus of a shared interest,
but recruited – at least in our society – from among what
provisionally we have only been able to define negatively,
namely the public.












talk of several publics, some implication that the audience
is nevertheless only a ‘public’ properly so called when the
transition has been made from a private to an ‘open’ hearing?
Does a jazz singer acquire a public only if those for whom he
or she sings have bought tickets that anyone might have pur-
chased? If so, the concept of public as audience is complex. It
implicates all three of the principal connotations of ‘public’:
the audience is ‘a public’ only when formed of persons drawn
from ‘the public’ in performances that are ‘in public’. Being
drawn from ‘the public’ is a matter of the accessibility in
principle of what is being presented to just anyone, even if in
practice it may be only a very small subsection of the public
that would dream of buying tickets.3
Still, it is interesting to ponder how far this, our second
sense of ‘public’ may nevertheless apply to the interests of
coteries whose ‘performances’ are not public because held in
private. For coteries can be large enough to form what we
might allow was indeed a public, that is to say an audience
large enough to count as ‘a public’, yet still not have ‘the
public’ as its audience as it would if its offerings had been
given ‘in public’. This applies, more obviously perhaps, to
clubs, some of which are devised simply to distinguish within
the public between acceptable and unacceptable guests. If
those allowed entry are still ‘the public’, that would add
strength to the assumption that, in respect of whatever enter-
tainments are offered there, they are just ‘a public’, an audience
drawn from ‘the public’.
Again, we may wonder whether, where a topic is too
specialized to capture wide interest, those who meet to share
their engagement in it, even where discussion is officially
open to the public, can properly be said to form a public. If not,









to form their own public it is always possible for them to
shelter under the umbrella of a larger, generic interest, such as
music or fine art. Devotees of traditional jazz may not be
numerous enough to form a public, but to the music industry
they are part of a jazz public that includes fans who appreciate
styles established later than the 1920s and which the former
abhor. Since the term ‘public’ in this sense is now largely
appropriated by market interests indifferent to such internal
distinctions and differences, reasons of this kind for denying
the existence of publics tend to vanish from view.
There can be other reasons for not wanting to belong to a
public, reasons that do not in this way vanish. Following one
special connotation of ‘public’, devotees of literary theory, for
instance, might deny that their interest was such as to gener-
ate a public, the reason being not lack of numbers but the fact
that the topic is too esoteric or requires too much cultivation
to appeal to anything so plebeian as a public.
Finally, the technological developments mentioned earlier
weaken and even sever the link between two of our senses of
‘public’: clearly someone who, in the privacy of their home,
plays a publicly available video or sound recording is not by
virtue of the latter fact hearing a performance ‘in’ public. But
as was suggested, this person is still occupying a kind of
public space, an abstract arena as it were, in which interests
that are shared are not shared in public, and in an important
sense therefore not shared at all, but repeated individually in a
multitude of privacies.
Luckily our intuitions or conclusions on these matters are
of no great relevance for the discussion that follows. Though
bearing the consequences of technology in mind, what we
must chiefly keep a firm hold on is the ‘logic’ that, in their












There is, however, another factor to note. In many areas of
shared interests, and perhaps in coteries in general, the notion
of a public in the sense discussed in this chapter can become
otiose. That is so where the sharing takes the form of per-
formers appreciating each others’ performances. Being able to
form a public is not merely a matter of numbers, there is also
a distance to account for: the distance between performer and
audience. What is called audience participation may seem to
belie this, but typically it does not. On the contrary, audiences
invited to participate in a performance are nothing like
the performers themselves, part of whose performance is to
co-opt members of the audience and get them to do what
they, the performers, want.
That is a possible analogy worth remembering. How far it
extends to the contemporary political situation in states that
have their (unique) publics is a matter of debate and judge-
ment. But the degree to which supposedly unique publics in
that sense have become multiple audiences as described here
is a question as crucial as it is topical. Dewey’s paradigmatic
public is by no means an audience. It is a sufficiently but not
too large group of people with a shared interest in the regula-
tion of the consequences of their joint actions, self-positioned
in a political system of which they are consciously at one
and the same time the private originators and common bene-
ficiaries. The state that does the regulating is the outcome of
the wishes of those who in the first instance form it and in
later instances support it. If ‘the’ public becomes no more
than an assemblage of unintegrated publics-as-audiences, so
that society is split into established executive authority on the
one side and interested spectators on the other, there is little











The public as audience is remarked on by Jürgen Habermas
in his classic study, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.
He observes that in ‘seventeenth-century France le public meant
the lecteurs, spectateurs, and auditeurs as the addressees and
consumers, and the critics of art and literature . . .’.1 This
is exactly the notion discussed in the previous chapter. Publics
form themselves around visible and audible focuses of atten-
tion, whether these are particular objects, persons, projects or
political programmes – topics, in other words, that groups
with a certain background find worth looking at, listening to
and at times even, where appropriate, find themselves stimu-
lated to act upon. The background is important in two ways:
on the one hand critical audiences are formed by those select
parts of the populace with the education and resources
required to appreciate and consume cultural artefacts, while
on the other, where the topics are of public concern, many
more than those with that background may be stimulated to
action.
So what is this public sphere? Let us start with a simple
story sketchily told that at least heads us in the right direction.
The details may then be seen the more readily to fall in place.
Here is the simple story: a burgeoning middle class, with its









political arrangements, constrained culturally, commercially,
and not least, and from a practical point of view first and
foremost, politically. That constraint motivates much of its
creative spirit, so that the literature it produces is for obvious
reasons directed in various ways at the political situation.
Talented authors and commentators gain their audiences and
engender debate. A discussion on how to run things is carried
on, at first in these limited circles but then later, as democratic
procedures begin to gain a footing, the discussion is widened,
very much so when the press becomes involved. The place
where the discussion occurs, an abstract space collecting all
the venues, is what is called the public sphere.
The public sphere can exist before the public as such exists.
As we said earlier, in order for a state to have its public there
must be a system of government designed to protect the
rights of individual citizens. However, before that system is in
place, so long as it is possible for some people in the society
in question freely and openly to discuss the prospects of
everyone taking part, equally freely and openly, in such dis-
cussion, the public sphere has at least a fledgling existence.
The idea of a public sphere is therefore in a sense normative;
even in its fledgling beginning where few take part, the idea it
represents is one of universal access. That idea was its raison
d’être. ‘The public sphere of civil society’, as Habermas himself
points out, ‘stood or fell with [this] principle’, so that ‘[a]
public sphere from which specific groups would eo ipso be
excluded was less than merely incomplete, it was not a public
sphere at all’.2
However, we shall see that the notion of ‘public’ here is, as
always, complex. The sphere we call public is in one sense a
kind of abstract commons, an area of public space (Habermas’s









manoeuvre that had to be created in defiance of the interests
and de facto private confines of an absolute power. But the
public sphere is also an arena in which matters are conducted
‘in public’.
Habermas’s discussion of this open space traces it back to
the European and British Enlightenment and its emergence in
the change from political absolutism to a bourgeois society.
Although the focus in discussions of the public sphere is
usually on political debate it would however be misleading to
suggest this was the only or even the main interest manifested
in the emergence of an arena where effective discussion could
be joined by people outside the confines of an absolute
authority. The public sphere is a space, a kind of noticeboard,
one might say, on which private citizens can publish not just
their political views but the products of their science and of
their art. In making his discoveries known to the world after
years of seclusion working up his theories,3 Isaac Newton was
contributing, if you like, to the furnishing of this open space.
The metaphor has its limitations. He was not, of course,
cluttering the space with furniture in a way that left less room;
on the contrary he was enlarging the space by providing it
with something new for examination and discussion by
others than those with unaccountable authority. That there is
a form of cluttering too is a matter we will return to, but the
crux itself, regarding the public sphere, is the transition
whereby debate on any subject becomes public. What had been
private and became public were areas of learning and expert-
ise, and also, be it noted, of authority. Once made open,
authority too could be questioned and discussed by those
qualified to do so, not now by position but by critical ability.
As is now widely accepted, not least due to Habermas,











discussions hitherto confined to the privacy of salons, began
to occupy premises on the street. The ‘street’ factor introduces
another aspect of publicness. Although not just anyone could
drop in to the coffee-house, it required no invitation to do so.
Naturally, to be able to discuss the latest literature one had to
be both literate and educated, and to be heard among the
experts forming the core of literary discussion required some
force of opinion and personality. That of course was no doubt
true also in the salons, and it would be wrong to minimize
the role these played in the forming of a public sphere. Were
some enlightened hostess to invite members of different
stations and estates to her soirées, on the basis of their interest
and not of their wealth or position, or were she to advertise
her soirées in ways available to a wider audience, she would
in effect have been taking a first step in the direction of
transforming her home into an actual part of that sphere.
But the word ‘public’ applies here in yet another way. One
important function of the salon was to break down social
barriers through their very composition, though in varying
degrees. The most celebrated salon was that of Mme Germaine
de Staël. It was held in Switzerland, by Lake Geneva, where in
1803 she had moved after Napoleon banished her from
France for her progressive political views and, not least, her
outspoken praise of Germany. The publicity attracted by ‘The
Salon of Europe’, as it was dubbed, centred as much if not
more on the famous names collected there as on the views
exchanged or passed on. Its gatherings of distinguished intel-
lectuals, writers and aristocrats included musical entertain-
ment, plays and poetry readings. However, another salon was
provided in Germany itself, in a far less palatial setting, in the
years from 1790 to 1806. Rahel Varnhagen (née Levin) was









fortunate, at a time when Jews were under heavy restrictions,
including only being allowed to use only two of the many
gates into Berlin, to receive a licence to establish himself in
business in that city. Without inheritance after her father
died, and unmarried for some time to come, the nineteen-
year-old Rahel opened a salon that brought together under
the same attic roof not only both Jews and Christians but also
poor writers who mingled with the most eminent literary
figures of the time: Friedrich Schlegel, the Humboldt
brothers, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Jean Paul, Clemens Bren-
tano and Ludwig Tieck.
What we see here in this and other salons is a democratic
spirit that gave their habitués a pre-taste of what the future
might hold in society as such. It gave them a goal towards
which their conversations could be aimed.
The role that Rahel Varnhagen’s salon played in Berlin
could be performed in even more democratic circumstances.
Thus, in Edinburgh, the leading figures of the Scottish
Enlightenment met to exchange views in basements given
over to oyster parties and amid carousing into which the
‘oyster wenches’ also entered. The step, socially as well as
physically, from the privacy, whether of salon or saloon, to
open debate was therefore but a small one. The coffee-house,
into which anyone with the will, education and interest could
enter in order to join in conversation on the burning issues of
the day, was virtually next door. Enlarged by its close links
with journalism, as well as the theatre and literature generally,
this public space became the precursor of the enormously
more complex and infinitely less transparent public sphere we
know today.
In this way, it is tempting to see in the genesis of the











the possibility of the realization of an ideal in which the
activity of the state can in principle be monitored and dir-
ected by informed, critical and public discourse. If at first not
the discourse of all the governed, in these beginnings at least
it was the discourse of those who had the good of all the
governed as their professed political aim.
But why should we believe this? The ability of a bourgeois
society to free itself from a system of governmental rule ill-
suited to its expanding mercantile interests might lead one to
suppose something else: that this was at heart simply a contest
in which a new authority with its own ambitions sought to
replace the old. That the spokesmen of the new society should
be assisting a process whereby authority itself was on the way
to being invested in ‘the people’ may seem an unlikely turn.
It is indeed conceivable that, if left to themselves, the bour-
geoisie might have assumed the role of an alternative absolute
authority, a growing but private elite steered by what they
called ‘reason’ but which was in fact a version of rationality
based on the background of their own commercial concep-
tions regarding the best way to run public affairs – the need,
for example, to expand the moneyed class. On this view, when
it became possible for anyone competent to join in such
discussion, but due to the limits of literacy and education,
competence itself was not just anyone’s, the reasons discus-
sion centred around concerns shared with those still excluded
were more or less subtly commercial, rather than straight-
forwardly democratic. Least subtly, it was less a matter of
spreading knowledge and freedom than of increasing buying
power by filling more pockets with purses.
A reason why this was not exactly the case is the part still
played precisely by authority. Not institutionalized authority









religion and the idea of divine right; rather it was the authority
of a climate of opinion shared among an increasingly influen-
tial class. But the climate itself was generated by, and gener-
ated in turn, its own authorities – a group of exceptionally
talented writers. The climate was humanistic and basically
secular and the writers collected under the title of the Augustan
Age, the name echoing that of the age of the Emperor Augustus
in Rome (27 – 14), famed for such poets as Horace,
Ovid and Virgil. England and France both had their Augustan
ages. The latter’s preceded the former’s and took place in an
earlier era as far as the transition from political absolutism to
bourgeois society is concerned. In late seventeenth-century
France, Corneille enjoyed the patronage of Richelieu, one of
whose principal aims was to bring the French population
under the heel of the Bourbon monarchy. Molière was pat-
ronized by the King himself. But it would be a mistake to see
Dryden’s appointments in England as Poet Laureate and
Historiographer Royal in the same light; he held them at a
time when limited monarchy was no longer just a prayer. The
events, beginning as they did with James II’s abdication, and
manner of the succession by William and Mary in the Glori-
ous Revolution of 1688–9 both testify to this.4 Politically
focused writers such as Dryden, Defoe, Pope, Addison, Swift
and Steele were the natural background of others such as
Samuel Richardson and Henry Fielding, though also Defoe
himself, who, by cultivating in the novel a less openly
provocative form of critique, social as well as political,
escaped the kinds of risk (censorship, imprisonment, exile)
to which political satirists exposed themselves. They were also
the background and precursor to philosophers such as John
Locke and that avowed seeker of literary fame, David Hume.











formulating the principles of humane, self-governing soci-
eties, owed as much to the accessibility of their writings as to
the way their thoughts gave shape to the new climate of opin-
ion. For which of course we may thank the literary virtues
they inherited from the classicist period.5 It is important also
to realize what might be called the general nature of philo-
sophical or political discussion at the time. Although literary
circles discussed literary matters, just as learned societies
discussed science, the clear boundaries today dividing and
delimiting these areas were not yet in place. Just as science
could consort with religion, so could literary circles involve
themselves in politics. One simple reason was the way that
literature itself had taken on a critical role, not just in satire
but also in portraying society in the novel (Richardson and
Fielding). It was as natural for literary circles as for writers
themselves to depict and, in doing so, implicitly comment on
social life, thus engaging conversationally in politics.
When amplified by this documentary form of fiction and a
developing journalism, such conversations could be easily
perceived as a threat to the entrenched monopoly of church
and state authorities in matters of common concern. In
France and in the principalities and duchies of Germany
things moved along more slowly and less smoothly. There,
such threats would naturally provoke the authorities into
enforcing their already existing powers of censorship. The
example of Immanuel Kant provides a rather different illustra-
tion of the emergence of alternative sources of political
authority.
Kant’s views on matters of principle commanded wide
respect and were taken seriously by government and governed
alike. In the early 1790s Kant was accorded such respect as an









topics was waited upon – either eagerly or anxiously. He had
earlier had some brushes with authority; his lectures were
monitored on account of their allegedly subversive anti-
religious bias, and an essay by Kant was actually forbidden
publication. The government was particularly interested in
what this well-established champion of human freedom
would say on the French Revolution. He had once earlier
expressed support for the revolution, but the Prussian govern-
ment would look amiss at any reasoned support of revolution.
So, as a commentator put it, ‘Kant’s philosophy stood trial
before the government’.6
However, considering the standing of the contestants, the
trial naturally commanded a wider audience and also a wider
jury. First, the jury would comprise several groups: those
colleagues and critics at home and abroad who were opposed
to Kantian rationalism, especially in ethics and religion, as
well as a larger circle of those who, unable to take part in the
contest or even properly to grasp the principles at issue, had a
personal interest in the outcome of this potential conflict
between perhaps the most eminent living representative of
the Enlightenment and a repressive government armed with
powers of censorship. For Kant to confirm his defence of the
revolution would be to raise the alarm in the government,
while to those who did have some grasp of the principles of
the Kantian philosophy, an attack on it would seem a viola-
tion of them. Thus, as the same commentator also says, Kant
stood on trial not just before the government but also ‘before
the public’.7
Several things can be learned from the example. First, it
shows how easy it is for the people, those whose interests are
allegedly at stake, to figure as the topic of politically oriented











Second, although as we think of it today at least in political
respects the public is officially cast in a participatory role, the
example shows what we anticipated earlier: how easily this
public splits into two: experts on the one hand and interested
spectators on the other. Just as the possible patrons of expensive
architects form an immediate public for the architects them-
selves, while a wider public – still theirs – is formed of those
affected in one way or another by what they succeed in having
built, so Kant’s public was formed in the first instance by
those in a position either to ‘buy’ his philosophy or to reject
it, and then of a wider circle of those personally interested in
what a man of authority and influence had to say.
Today, of course, the public commanded by Kant is a thing
of the past, and if Kant can be said to have any public today, it
consists largely of students, commentators and followers who
devote themselves to mastering the intricacies of this great
thinker’s thought.
Kant’s way out of his dilemma was to defend the principles
of the revolution but not the methods employed. Our com-
mentator’s verdict is that this was not just a piece of situation-
saving casuistry on Kant’s part but in the service of a higher
ideal: freedom of the press.8 If Kant may seem at first glance to
have extricated himself from a nasty situation by engaging in
something so contrary to his philosophy as a form of negoti-
ation or compromise, there is another way of looking at it.
The distinction between what a government proclaims as its
ideals and the actual means it adopts to achieve them is a vital
practical one and central to Kant’s moral philosophy. What
we can see Kant primarily doing here is addressing a govern-
ment whose conservative ideals may not be reprehensible in
themselves, but whose repressive means of resisting reform









the most obvious case of such repression. As Kant said
in another place, and with no suggestion of compromise:
‘Freedom of the pen is the only safeguard of the rights of the
people.’9
Censorship, along with the kind of government that
employs it, is no longer part of the default style of rule. It is
reverted to in emergencies real and alleged, but generally in
conditions that can be made acceptable to the public, and
always with the proviso that it be limited and retracted as
soon as conditions allow. This is part of a wider change
regarding authority. Intellectual genius is no longer respected
as a source of moral authority, guidance in this respect either
being left to traditional beliefs or made a matter of individual
conscience, though the latter often mediated by the corrupting
influence of leaders of religious and other sects.
Freedom from authority and the campaign waged by
writers for ‘freedom of the pen’ merge in the concept of a
public sphere. As the space in which matters of common
concern can be openly discussed and accepted as having a
legitimate influence on government policies, the public
sphere looks as if it should be the cornerstone of a democratic
society. Yet questions remain about this public sphere. Among
the more fundamental is the question of where to look for the
answers. Is there still some authority to appeal to at least on
this matter?
An obvious question is who is to take part. In the begin-
ning that was decided by the participants themselves, or by
their backgrounds, which were of a fairly uniform nature.
They were sharers in a progressive culture which had its aims
defined for it by the forms of government that then existed
and by the limitations imposed both on open debate and, just











freedom of the press and of speech were obvious first
requirements. But the idea that everyone should participate on
equal terms in the discussing and ordering of these affairs was
no part of the original plan. Indeed, a main motivation for
establishing the public sphere at all on this small scale was to
take into account the accepted impossibility at the time of
everyone shifting politically for themselves. The first thing
these fledgling public spheres had to do was fend for them-
selves. The first priorities, before entering into questions of
political organization, were the freedoms of speech and of the
printed word for the already literate and educated, as Kant
clearly saw. Unless the liberal messages that resulted from
their debates could be broadcast and could find a public
beyond the limited circles in which they occurred, they could
hardly be expected to help further the expectations of the
population at large. The question of how to incorporate this
population into political debate itself was another matter.
An influential answer to this question has been offered by
Habermas. In the notion of an ideal speech situation, he
attempted to pinpoint and thus allow for factors that prevent
people arriving at balanced judgements. The project pre-
supposes that participants in debate have the required back-
ground knowledge and mental ability. The point is that they
can still be hampered by the grip of an ideology or some
inner hang-up. An ideal speech situation is one where all
participants are freed of repressive mechanisms, social and
psychological, that might muzzle or distort the apprecia-
tion of what others say. A tall order, as everyone including
Habermas would admit. But is it a good answer, or is it a
rationalist’s answer, or, if so, is the fact of it being a rational-
ist’s answer a reason for general agreement about it being a









Whatever conclusions one draws concerning Habermas’s
views on what the public sphere should be, there is less
controversy concerning what it is. We can at least all be agreed
that, compared with the times of its origins, the public
sphere, its composition and aims are today incomparably less
transparent. Put starkly, it is a commercialized arena in which
debate is hard to distinguish from entertainment, a space
which, unlike its modest progenitor, offers not so much ever-
wider opportunities for serious debate as an expanding bill-
board on which economic and partisan interests compete
with each other for the private individual’s custom. The
vacuum left by the absence of central authority, whether
governmental or intellectual, tends easily to be filled by a
variety of role models or, in the case of religious sects and
their ilk, by rigid group disciplines. Authority has not disap-
peared, it has merely changed its face. It manifests itself in
rhetoric and defends itself, as well as whatever hard measures
it decides to take, including censorship, in the name of
expertise and information from protected sources. It is in the
nature of the case, including as it does a natural capacity to
invent technologies of communication, that in political mat-
ters audiences far outstrip participants. The public, as we have
said, if or when it is anything, is typically an audience. It holds
at best a watching brief.
Yet the ideals which gave birth to the public sphere were
inherently of a participatory kind, and an essential element in
sharing an interest in the public good was a common interest
in discussing that good. Originally, the circles spoke to a public
limited to the literate. Yet inevitably, and as literacy, more
particularly political literacy, increased, they became produ-
cers with an audience, the public referred to by Habermas in











watching, listening – playing the part of consumers, a role
that in the end can embrace ‘the public’ as a whole.
In this there seems to be something inevitable. As a would-
be player, or play space, on the political scene the public
sphere appears doomed to become a sphere of what we earlier
referred to as anonymous ‘anyones’. This is already implicit in
the ‘eclipse’ of the public, referred to by Dewey, though he
also saw it as a crystallization into separate worlds of interest
with their correspondingly mutually independent ‘publics’.
The problem is sheer size; the larger the nation, the more
information and the wider the perspective required of those
who would guide its future. Correspondingly the increasingly
ill-equipped the private citizen to take on that task. The polit-
ical theorist and columnist Walter Lippmann attacked those
who still thought the public could be educated to the task and
who clung to theories of popular government. He wrote that
such theory ‘rests upon the belief that there is a public which
directs the course of events’, while this public is ‘a mere
phantom . . . [and] an abstraction’.10
Curiously, the very same words were used by Søren
Kierkegaard almost a century earlier. But he used them with a
difference that is worth dwelling on. The phantom Kierkegaard
refers to was a notional and non-obligating replacement for
the active groupings of times gone (nations, city-states, fac-
tions, clans), in which the group itself was accountable to
others for the actions of its individual members and the latter
in turn responsible individually to the group. In a world no
longer supporting the kind of dynamism in which it was
natural for such groups to operate, and in which they found
their active place, individuals are left, bare-headed as it were,
to make their own judgements and to account for their own









these individuals seek a surrogate cover. It is the public; and
both it and the appearance it gives of being some actual
grouping are a sham created by the press. It is, says Kierkegaard,
‘only when no energetic association gives substance to the
concretion that the press creates this abstraction, the public,
composed as it is of unreal individuals who are not and never
can be united in the contemporaneousness of a situation or
organization, and who nevertheless, it is insisted, are a whole’.
Kierkegaard remarks, in the same place, that the public is a
concept that cannot possibly occur in antiquity, for then ‘a
people itself had to appear en masse, in corpore, at the scene of the
action . . .’. This substitute, limitless phantom-grouping, the
public, appears nowhere, ‘it makes for no situation and no
assembly’, and ‘as you would expect, the abstraction formed
paralogistically by individuals, instead of helping them,
makes them recoil from one another’.11
Lippmann’s ‘mere phantom’ is more in the nature of an
impossible ideal. The ideal as well as its impossibility arise
from the distance that exists in modern societies between the
governing and the governed. He says, ‘The private citizen
today has come to feel rather like a deaf spectator in the back
row, who ought to keep his mind on the mystery off there,
but cannot quite manage to keep awake’.12 What Lippmann,
like Dewey, had in mind was the complexity of the modern
commonwealth and the breadth of vision required to make
informed political decisions. As we noted, Dewey was think-
ing from the perspective of a settler nation that has to organize
itself without help or hindrance of local tradition, and he saw
the public as originally a self-established entity in relation to a
state that it had itself put in place. Expansion from small and
local beginnings took this public out of its depth. Lippmann,











ethical, populist, and socialist’) for this situation, says that ‘all
[these remedies] assume that either the voters are inherently
competent to direct the course of affairs or that they are mak-
ing progress toward such an ideal’. He says, ‘I think it is a false
ideal. I do not mean an undesirable ideal. I mean an unattain-
able ideal, bad only in the sense that it is bad for a fat man to
try to be a ballet dancer.’ Further, ‘The individual man does
not have opinions on all public affairs . . . there is not the least
reason for thinking, as mystical democrats have thought, that
the compounding of individual ignorances in masses of
people can produce a continuous directing force in public
affairs.’13
Dewey, an advocate of progressive education, was cautiously
optimistic on behalf of participatory democracy, seeing some
promise of a public able to understand and monitor the
explanations of expert administrators. Lippmann for his part
was unremittingly pessimistic; participatory democracy was a
romantic dream. Whatever possible grounds there may be
today for cautious optimism or a qualified scepticism, in any
society even faintly resembling our own, it is surely indisput-
able that the possibility of a public formed of ‘perfect citizens’
is a thing of the past.14 What we educate nowadays are special-
ists able to fill roles in a complex economic machine. There
is, indeed, a factor that might have drawn Lippmann and
Dewey closer together had they lived through recent events.
We will draw attention to it later. In anticipation let us refer to
another feature of modern society these early twentieth-
century writers failed to foresee but which is now evident to
everyone.
Lippmann distinguishes ‘insiders’, as expert administrators
and economic experts able to ‘make decisions’, from ‘out-









placed’ that they can ‘understand and act’, the outsiders are as
if ‘trying to navigate the ship from dry land’. They are ‘neces-
sarily ignorant, usually irrelevant and often meddlesome’.15
But today Lippmann’s insiders are themselves outsiders in
respect of a system or network of interests in respect of which
they too are outsiders, a system or network by which they are
at any rate constrained. All this has been noted and discussed
in detail by political philosophers, as well as by political
commentators.
An important voice here is Habermas’s. He speaks, as we
know, for a democratic society in which citizens have access
to political debate and can themselves be heard in it. To him
the problem is one of communication. He points accordingly
to the communicative infrastructure of society as the area (or
collection of areas) crucially undermined by commercial
forces. It is these that hinder free and open, or rational, debate.
To correct the situation he proposes that the influence of
those areas of life coordinated by communication should be
widened, and in particular he suggests, as one commentator
has put it, that we ‘subordinate economic and administrative
subsystems to decisions arrived at in open, critical, public
debate’.16
There seems an obvious problem here. The ‘we’ who sub-
ordinate these subsystems to such debate must be a public
already freed from the inhibiting influence of the com-
mercialized media, or at least recruited from an otherwise
passive public in sufficient numbers to acquire enough influ-
ence to counter those commercial forces. In short, how could
an open and critical public debate that is effective in control-
ling the influence of commercial forces on the media be
staged unless the communicative infrastructure had already











open, critical debate in a world where the media are so
essential to ‘mediating’ that debate, would indicate that the
obstructive subsystems had already been brought under
‘human’ control. If humanizing and expanding the communi-
cational infrastructure have to come first, what hope is there
of that so long as the mass media continue to feed off their
willing public?
As our brief references to Dewey and Lippmann already
indicate, the idea of an open and critical debate on public
matters in a large society is itself problematic. It isn’t just the
numbers, or the problem of coordinating a multitude of local
debates. That presupposes that the insider/outsider distinc-
tion can be overcome. But in a modern society how can that
ever be a realistic aim? That it is not so might have been
discerned in the very origins of the idea of the public sphere.
The coffee-house debates cannot be treated as microcosmic
versions of a nationwide debating forum where the public
can be heard speaking for itself. They were indeed merely
relocated extensions of the discussions held in the privacy of
the salons. Wherever the discussions took place, due to their
position the debaters were in a sense already virtual politi-
cians and insiders. It would be nearer the letter and spirit of
the coffee-house origins of public debate to say that, far from
aiming to eradicate the outsider/insider distinction, such
debate essentially presupposed it. It is true, as we noted, that
those who met there spoke, in a public spirit, for those who
for several reasons were not there; and also true that those
absent included the many who lacked the education to take
part. But suppose they had acquired it. The problem would
not be merely one of space, though that is one side. More to
the point, even if there had been space a conversation on such









have, across borders of experience and expertise. A conversa-
tion of all with all would need its own Hobbes and a Leviathan














Our newspapers speak to us as much of public opinion as they
do of the public whose opinion it supposedly is. And there
seems no getting away from the fact that there is such a thing.
It is easily outraged, sometimes upset, politicians appeal to it,
try to influence it, we ourselves often side with it against our
politicians. We, the public, were horrified by photographs of
torture in the Abu Ghraib prison. Our horror might have
some effect on the conduct of affairs. Documentaries on
famine and other, nearer-to-home injustices may sometimes
do more than just leave us alone with our feelings of impo-
tence and loss of hope; they may also help to create climates
of opinion that, if too late for many, have some effect on the
future by forcing the hands of leaders sensitive to how ‘the
public’ thinks.
But how can an entity as diffuse as the public think at all?
Further, if it did, why should its views be taken seriously? As
outsiders, we, the public, are just not well-enough informed
on a wide-enough range of politically relevant topics to see
what needs to be done on the political front. To let public
opinion decide would be like trying to navigate the ship from
the shore. National referenda may be an exception, but the
only other familiar scenario is revolution.









public opinion. He claims moreover that it serves a useful
political function. That function? He calls it the neutralization
of force. Lippmann sees the mobilization of public opinion in
times of crisis as helping to restore things to normal, bringing
us back to that ‘habitual process of life’ in which we ‘live and
let live’.1
An important proviso is that the public at such ‘junctures’
delivers its opinion only on matters of the kind that can
properly concern it. Although Lippmann does not quite say so
himself, these concerns may be assumed to be of a general
kind, topics that you do not need to be an insider to appreci-
ate. In these cases, then, insiders may no longer disparage the
opinion of outsiders. Developing this idea further, though
probably beyond anything Lippmann had in mind, we might
take these concerns to have a moral component, or, better,
to embrace what comes within the broad compass of what
Charles Taylor has recently discussed under the label ‘social
imaginary’. Our social imaginary is ‘the way our con-
temporaries imagine the societies they inhabit and sustain’.
Taylor offers an account of how our own imaginary comes to
embrace a ‘new conception of the moral order of society’.
The latter, he says, has its source in the ‘minds of influential
thinkers’.2 They provide a conception of order that gradually
filters down into the various levels of society, until the con-
ception itself becomes more or less integral to the way in
which we think of ourselves, insiders and outsiders alike.
This chapter combines two thoughts from the above. One
is that public opinion does indeed function in something like
the way Lippmann proposes; there are critical junctures in the
otherwise normal lives of a society when we may talk
appropriately of the way or ways in which its public thinks.









These can alert people to things which may draw them
together in forming an opinion. What Lippmann does not say
is that, beyond disturbances in an otherwise stable way of life,
the sight of visible injustice even in the normal course of
events can also arouse the public’s anger. In general, public
opinion can serve just as well to undermine a stable status quo
as to restore it.
The goal of stable society has guided the thinking of every
political thinker from Plato to Rawls. One solution is to try to
prevent instability from the start, another is to ‘neutralize’
it when it occurs. Among the neutralizers is the Scottish
philosopher, David Hume, a writer who antedated the arrival
of the public as we know it, but whose attempt to find a way
of dealing with popular sentiment affords us an excellent
opportunity to disassemble the notion of public opinion into
its components and its antecedents and to reconstruct it in
what can be offered as a theory of public opinion, positioning
it in the political space of societies such as our own.
In 1742, Hume published an essay collection, Essays Moral
and Political. It included a short piece entitled ‘Idea of a Perfect
Commonwealth’. Hume presented his proposal in ‘as few
words as possible’, since ‘[a] long dissertation on that head
would not . . . be very acceptable to the public’. His public, in
this case one that would ‘be apt to regard such disquisition
both as useless and chimerical’,3 would be readers able to
respond to the solid good sense and acid realism of Hume’s
proposals. They could listen without having to enter into
learned and abstract discussion of the principles on which the
proposals were based. Since these principles were in any case of
a strongly utilitarian kind that would appeal to a general public
without further argument, nothing essential was omitted. The









the desirability of introducing a more limited monarchy into
British government, a matter of interest wide enough at that
time to command an audience, or a public. It attempts, demo-
cratically, to speak to the reason of a far wider circle than Kant
could have expected to reach fifty years later.
In due course Hume’s public came to include many others
to whom his proposals and reflections must have seemed even
more relevant. The Virginian-born James Madison incorpor-
ated some of them in his ‘Notes on the Confederacy’ pub-
lished in 1787 over ten years after Hume’s death.4 Madison
himself, one of the framers of the American constitution
and collaborator in the Federalist Papers, became the fourth US
President (1809–17).
The relevance of Hume’s remarks for the American consti-
tution is to be found in what he had to say on establishing a
commonwealth ‘in an extensive country’. Concern for effect-
ive democratic procedures might seem to dictate proximity;
the voices of the distant are hard to hear, sometimes conveni-
ently so for those not partial to what they say, but regrettably
in the light of the ideal that everyone has a right not just to
speak but also to be heard. Against this ‘common opinion’, as
he calls it, Hume argues that distance acts as a useful barrier
to the kind of popular turmoil that impedes piecemeal
democratic progress. For if ‘modelled with masterly skill’, he
says, a ‘large government’ allows ‘compass and room enough
to refine the democracy’,5 that is to say, to correct any
undemocratic tendency due to sheer size. The model he
recommends has local voters electing representatives to their
county, these in turn electing magistrates for their own
counties and a senator. It is the senators, who meet in the










This hierarchical system of transference of power, in order
to work as an instrument of piecemeal democratic reform,
had to be protected from disruptive elements. Populism was a
main source of disruption. Giving scope to a higher magis-
trate’s personal appeal gives him greater political leverage
than is due on the basis of the constituency he officially repre-
sents. Alternatively, the members of the constituencies might
form larger de facto constituencies on their own, making the
commonwealth bottom-heavy, a weakness in any political
system. Democracies, says Hume, ‘are turbulent’ and, how-
ever much the people are organized into small groups as
voters or representatives, their ‘near habitation in a city
will always make the force of popular tides and currents very
sensible’. The advantage of a government whose ‘parts’ are
sufficiently ‘distant and remote’ is that ‘it is very difficult,
either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into
measures against the public interest’.7
Since Hume’s time, modern travel, the expanding media
and the unlimited embrace of cyberspace have enabled even
the largest commonwealths to approximate the conditions of
near habitation. But another kind of remoteness must be con-
sidered: cultural diversity due to large-scale immigration. On
‘[t]he stream of immigrants that has poured in’, Dewey
remarks that it ‘is so large and heterogeneous that under
conditions which formerly obtained it would have disrupted
any semblance of unity as surely as the migratory invasion of
alien hordes once upset the social equilibrium of the European
continent’.8 We may ask whether any unity is now due as
much to the diversity as to its lack. Cities, too, have changed
immensely since the mid-eighteenth century, both in size and
composition. Cultural diversity and distance are a defining









assumption, they seem to form excellently stable common-
wealths in their own right. But leaving aside possible amend-
ments to Hume’s premises, what we need to consider is the
assumption that what Hume calls popular tides and currents
work against the public interest.
In describing such tides and currents in terms of force,
Hume suggests that popular movements resemble in some
way forces of nature. They are not the work of reason. Like
raging torrents, they need to be resisted or contained if polit-
ical reason is to prevail. The metaphor of tides and currents
brings to mind attitudes and tendencies subject to outside
influence rather than as self-generated drives from within the
body politic. Tides change as do currents, in strength as well
as direction. Hume thinks such tendencies in the population
at large are divisive as well as disruptive: ‘Although it is more
difficult to form a republican government in an extensive
country than in a city, there is more facility, when once it is
formed, of preserving it steady and uniform without tumult
and faction’.9
Though aimed at a lay audience, Hume’s proposals for the
democratic state are still typical of the philosopher. This
commonwealth has a top-down structure with reason in
control, though a reason disseminated as widely as possible
but with safeguards against unruly intervention from below.
Admittedly the reason is not that of a rationalist philosopher.
Hume appeals to a general consensus that people will arrive at
on their own authority once the point has been made clearly
enough to them. A companion essay, ‘Of Original Contract’,
ends by appealing to general opinion. There is ‘in all questions
with regard to morals, as well as criticism’, says Hume, ‘no
other standard by which any controversy can be decided’.10









arrive at common-sensical conclusions, given the right condi-
tions for doing so. One of these is that the conclusions be
shorn of unnecessary intellectual trappings. Hume’s ‘Idea of a
Perfect Commonwealth’ is itself tailor-made to elicit just the
kind of assent that he expects of reasonable people in the right
setting. Such assent differs from the popular, or populist,
views which Hume thinks must be prevented from taking
effect, if not also forming.
The populism Hume refers to is not what we would call
public opinion. But then neither is Hume’s ‘general opinion’
that. It is not the former, because what we refer to as public
opinion, whatever its content, would not generally be
regarded as a threat to the state as such; if critical it would be
at most a threat to a sitting government. As we are well aware,
it can just as well support the government. Nor is it the latter,
because in Hume’s day general opinion was still confined to
an educated elite able to appreciate the kind of problems with
which the essay on a perfect commonwealth deals and to
judge the persuasiveness of Hume’s proposed solutions.
According to one writer, it was Voltaire who just a little
later ‘invented’ the idea of public opinion, or, as he says,
‘virtually’ invented it. We must look at both the claim and the
qualification.11
By the time Hume’s essay appeared, Voltaire was Europe’s
most widely read author and playwright. But he also became a
controversial and frenetically energetic polemicist in the cause
of free-thinking. Although his faith in good sense was as great
as Hume’s, while Hume was concerned mainly to assert,
against the rationalists, that good sense was good enough and
in any case all we had, Voltaire went out of his way to attack
those institutions that prohibited its free play. Besides his









politician, having been personal adviser to Frederick the
Great. Home from his political exploits abroad, he became a
notorious political satirist and pamphleteer. In 1762, Voltaire
was approached by the widow of one Jean Calas, a leading
textile merchant in Toulouse.12 Calas had been convicted on
suspicion of murdering his son and brutally broken on the
wheel. Voltaire who, as our commentator points out, had
never produced the kind of systematic work that would earn
him a place in the pantheon of philosophers, but whose
‘already long career had been made up in good part of looking
for the right way to force the hand of governments’, seized
this opportunity to indulge his passionate interest in reform.
Convinced, after due investigation, that a grave injustice
had been perpetrated, Voltaire took personal charge of the
Calas case and ‘began pouring out a torrent of words in all
directions’.13
One important factor is that, like Hume, Voltaire kept his
arguments at a level where ordinary literate people would
understand them and see their point – one reason why people
may have failed to acknowledge him as a bona fide philosopher.
Second, however, and quite unlike Hume, Voltaire exploited
actual examples of glaring injustice to generate opposition to
the system of government that was able to perpetrate them. If
this is where the notion was born then public opinion is
already, in its origins, a political notion. Its clear connections
with what would become political journalism are also evi-
dent. As Saul says, Voltaire ‘developed the idea that specific,
heart-rending cases could be converted into great battles
which would set standards and force widespread reform’.14
One might say, in words he himself would not have chosen,
that in his hard-fought campaign against fanaticism, Voltaire









good sound sense, the space we now refer to as the ‘public
sphere’. He himself, a spokesman for the enlightened middle
classes rather than principled enemy of monarchical govern-
ment, would have regarded it rather as a matter of defending
freedom of thought and religious tolerance against tyranny
and bigotry.15
But if the public belongs originally to a politically focused
ambience in which the individual stands in the centre and
enjoys certain rights of protection from the state, the opinion
that Voltaire aroused crossed state borders. Two factors were at
work here: the literary fame that had already given him an
international audience and the nature of the causes he chose
to champion. Injustice at the hands of the powers that be is a
cause close to the hearts of the people of most nations and, we
may assume, especially so at a time when potentially demo-
cratic procedures of the kind Hume drafted were, if not
indeed utopian, for many nations still a thing of the future.
Thus Voltaire, for the battles he was in a position to generate,
could, as Saul puts it, mobilize a vast ‘army’. As we know,
Voltaire was by no means the first writer to engage his readers
on a political front. Nor, as Zola’s decisive defence of Alfred
Dreyfus in 1898 testifies, is the tradition confined to pre-
democratic states. But, given reservations still to be discussed
about what it means to talk of public opinion, Voltaire was
certainly the first to command a politically engaged audience
wide enough to warrant identifying the source of the support
he received as that of a population comparable with what we
nowadays refer to as the public.
The example of Voltaire provides clear support for the
notion of public opinion as that of an audience someone is
able to capture by highlighting and provoking interest in a









the circumstances of the time, Voltaire was able to impart, to a
wide audience already disposed both to read him and to react
to tales of injustice close to home, his own concern with
examples of injustice, examples that he was in a special pos-
ition to make conspicuous. Were we looking for some general
definition of public opinion, we might do worse than begin
by saying that it is, in the form of a currently adopted attitude
or belief, a manifestation of a set of ready-formed dispositions
to respond to some respected source of information.
It is nevertheless true that we typically employ the notion
of public opinion in the context of national politics. That is no
doubt because it is a vital factor in the survival of our own
governments. But the fact does not prevent our saying that
public opinion, even there, deserves its name just as much
because it is an opinion made public as because it is the
opinion of the public. We can say that public opinion consists
in dispositions to listen to respected sources. Saying that dis-
positions are to be found in the public is not the same as
saying that they are the dispositions of this public. The disposi-
tions are those of individuals in this or that population, in this
case the population that forms the public. They consist in a
readiness among a fair number of citizens to respond to issues
close to home: abortion, social welfare, environmental and
economic issues, national security, even who should coach
the national football team. There would be nothing wrong in
saying that these were responses of the public, but saying it
must not be taken to infer that the opinion is one necessarily
confined to ‘the public’; many issues, especially injustice, are
close to home in a sense that is not dependent on national
identities. Again, of course, we might want to say that in such
cases it is just a wider public that forms ‘the public’, and it is









have ceased to treat the idea of the public as a component in a
state, or at most it would be to treat wider units than actual
states as political. It might even be taken as shorthand for a
combination of actual states. Rather than any of these, we are
preferring the alternative: public opinion is so called because
it is an opinion that has captured a public, its own public.
Nevertheless, for public opinion to carry the political
weight we know that it does, something more seems needed.
In the first place, politicians respond to public opinion only
because they themselves know or at least believe that a signifi-
cant number of people hold the relevant beliefs. Second, they
might care considerably less about the fact that these beliefs
were held in whatever numbers if they supposed that those
individuals who held them did not know that other indi-
viduals did so as well. Thus it is only when individual voices
combine into a single vox populi that anything called public
opinion can have any political weight. A little cynically, one
might even claim that in many cases, unless they knew that
others held the belief, those holding the belief would them-
selves be less likely to do so, certainly less likely to voice it.
However that may be, all this indicates that there is yet
another sense of ‘public’ at work in our notion of public
opinion, namely ‘public’ in the sense of ‘open’, that is, as a
voice, or a unison chorus, audible to all able to listen in the
public sphere.
That is what we should expect. Public opinion is opinion
made public. It is also the opinion of many people. One
normal and quite natural way of putting this is to say it is the
opinion of the public. But what has been argued here tells
against the idea that there is a public and that it forms an
opinion.









conveyed to the public generate audiences for those opinions.
This is not to say that individuals form their views about
public policy only by being part of an audience that responds
to the views as they are already articulated in the public
sphere. Some do not do that; they form their views or at least
their formulations of them in private. Some may even take
time and trouble to sift out what they themselves think. But
that in general is not the way in which what we refer to as
public opinion comes about. Whatever individual citizens
believe about matters of public concern (and the fact that
public opinion typically concerns itself with public affairs
adds yet another ‘public’ flavour to the notion), whenever
there is something to refer to as public opinion, it is when
something or someone sets people’s minds in motion so that
it registers on their political consciousness. The opinions set
in motion are best described as propensities or dispositions,
or better, as deep-seated and shared preferences that (calling
to mind Hume’s hydrographic metaphors) surface when
suitably described events evoke them.
From this it may seem that public opinion comes closer to
Hume’s popular tides and currents, with their implications
for tumult and faction, than to his ‘general opinion’. Ideally,
it would be better if it tended towards the latter. General
opinion, as something to appeal to – as Hume himself appealed
to it in presenting his criticism of the notion of an original
contract – is not a set or repertoire of pre-established prefer-
ences ready to be invoked on cue. It is the product of a state of
mind congenial to making judgements, enabling individuals
separately to arrive at common-sensical and just conclusions
in context. Public opinion is, to the contrary, a set of disposi-
tions to feel strongly about some topic that is brought to one’s









expression of it, the way in which the public views its own
preference, also has its origin there. True, having access to the
public sphere, certain individuals can contribute both to what
is made topical there and to how it is formulated. But mostly
the case is as it was with Voltaire, if not on the same scale.
Voltaire’s voice was that of a super-celebrity able to arouse a
popular response to his depictions of glaring injustice and
social inequality within the political frame his depictions
provided. Part, then, of what is implied in saying that Voltaire
invented the idea of public opinion is the fact that the influence
he exercised was precisely not due to his taking part as a
member of an already formed public. As for his inventing it
virtually, that may be understood in terms of the time in which
Voltaire lived. Just as the public came into its own only with
the establishing of a public sphere, so too with public
opinion. It had to wait until it was possible to say, though
mistakenly, that it is the opinion of that public.
It is important that Voltaire’s authority and his ability to
exercise it were expressions of the time. Two opposite per-
spectives help to identify that particular historical situation: a
bottom-up or grass-roots perspective which discloses the
historical conditions in which the topic of injustice was ‘close
to home’ to so many, and a top-down perspective which notes
the pervasive influence of Enlightenment thought at the time,
and the way in which autocratic governments, by having the
bases of their clerical as well as secular authority undermined,
were gradually being forced to respond to public pressure.
A combination of the two offers a prospective view of that
highly symbolic event, the storming of the Bastille on 14 July
1789, and the wide-ranging political, economic and social
changes that resulted. These changes, though by no means the









not the fulfilment of Voltaire’s own dream, at least conse-
quences of the movement towards legal justice which is
where his passions were directed. It has been claimed that the
reason why political change in France, unlike Britain, took the
form of revolution was the characteristic appeal of the philos-
ophes to abstract reason, evident also in Voltaire but not Hume.
It set a goal of the regeneration of humankind that lay beyond
the capacity of ordinary people, with the result that these
were disdained as the ‘masses’, a majority of people incapable
of enlightenment.16 The abstract reasoning gave rise to the
French Revolutionary concept of citoyen in which the individual
was thought of as personifying the state. Since the state
remains itself, actual individuals become abstract and replace-
able. Conversely, the state becomes ‘the individual’. Hume set
the tone of the British Enlightenment, with its more prosaic
and humane approach, when in introducing his own concep-
tion of a model commonwealth he said, ‘All plans of govern-
ment which suppose great reformation in the manners of
mankind are plainly imaginary.’17
Nowadays, due partly to the effects of the changes which
both enlightenments brought about, authority of the kind
Voltaire exercised can scarcely arise, or at any rate be wielded.
Again two factors can be noted. Due less to the changes them-
selves than to the motivating idea behind them, the
Enlightenment movement to which both Hume and Voltaire
in their different ways belonged contained a built-in demise
of such authority. The aim was to clear the way for free and
rational individuals capable of creating the conditions of a
free society, a society where tolerance and justice reigned. In
such a society there should be no reason for philosophers like
Kant or writers like Voltaire to be in possession of insights









Second, although injustice survives in western societies,
the presence as part of these societies of an area in which
wrongs can be advertised and pressure put on governments or
local authorities to redress them means that the individuals in
these societies are themselves now in principle able to bring
such wrongs to public attention, the more easily because such
things are now universally recognized as wrongs. The spot-
light merely needs to be turned on or the whistle blown,
though blowing the whistle has its personal costs and can
cause new injustice. Ideally at least, we live in societies of the
kind Hume envisaged, in which there is ‘compass and room
enough to refine the democracy’. They are societies in which
the sensationalism that an exceptional writer like Voltaire
could exploit has become the speciality of the journalist and
mass media, not of individual literary talent.
What Enlightenment thinkers, optimistic about the
authority that could be placed in the individual’s powers of
independent reasoning, did not see was the rising complexity
of a society based on property-ownership. Initially, property-
ownership was made a requirement of political participation
because it entailed a personal investment in society. Hume’s
blueprint allowed only freeholders to be voters or representa-
tives. These property-owners could be called the initial
‘public’, just because they had, as proprietors, an area in cash
or kind of guaranteed privacy, from which they could then
emerge in order to engage with one another in ‘public life’,
that is to say, in deliberative and executive activity on behalf
of the population as a whole. The liberal ideal of a public
sphere was that everyone should somehow be included in this
area. However, as the public grew, not just with the popula-
tion but more importantly as the requirements of private









further development of capitalism and the workings of the
market led to new possibilities of injustice. In place of the
ideal of a public sphere in which the state is effectively moni-
tored by the governed, the state is now one among several
factors in a field of forces that operate on both it and the
public. The effect on the latter is, as noted in the previous
chapter, to isolate it from the very regulatory system that on
an account like Dewey’s was its own invention. The public are
effectively excluded from exerting any influence on this field
of forces. Or rather, echoing Lippmann, the public as an entity
remains only in the form of a phantom; largely depoliticized,
not just by choice but by the barriers that prevent outsiders
becoming insiders, what remains of the public in political
terms is an amorphous assembly of clienteles, constituencies
and lobbies.
It may seem a paradox that it is the political public that is
on the way out at the very moment rational man (in a gender-
neutral sense) is now supposedly in place, privacy secured by
civil law, and the individual’s judgemental authority guaran-
teed by virtue of there being no other recognized authority
than sound common sense, the exercise of which is poten-
tially open to all. But increasingly there is correspondingly
little for this individual to decide, except when occasionally
casting a vote or answering a questionnaire. Armed with a
guarantee of freedom of movement in all public spaces,
including some where the forces themselves can be seen or
heard at work, or the results of their interplay put on view and
publicly debated, all this individual has is at best, as we said
earlier, a watching brief.
How could it be otherwise? This vast public itself could
never form an assembly. This truth was carried to its logical









the smaller the community the better the opportunity for an
open and democratic life.18 Although nowadays, given well-
nigh universal education and limitless information, one can
disagree with Hume’s view that even in smaller populations
‘[i]f the people debate, all is confusion’, and even if, given the
possibility of televised discussions by well-informed people,
we may no longer fear, as Hume did, that the matters in hand
be not so much debated for their own sake as reduced to the
platitudinous level of gossip and suggestion,19 it is still hard to
see where more discussion can lead in the quest for justice and
the good life. More important, surely, is an ability to recognize
and correct for the distortions that reach us in the discussions
that already take place among insiders, and in the con-
sequences to which their decisions lead.
In this respect we are in a position not unlike the one
towards which Hume’s remarks seem directed. Not
unsurprisingly for a Tory, Hume makes an undemocratic-
sounding remark, but his reason for making it appears less
undemocratic. He refers to ‘[t]he lower sort of people and
small proprietors’ and says they are ‘good enough judges of
one not too distant from them in rank or habitation . . . and
therefore, in their parochial meetings, will probably choose
the best, or nearly the best representative [but] they are
wholly unfit for county meetings, and for electing into the
higher offices of the republic’. Why are they unfit? Because
‘[t]heir ignorance gives the grandees an opportunity of
deceiving them’.20
Today, assuming perhaps unwisely that universal education
has taken care of Hume’s scruples, the growth of professional
government and expertise has nevertheless introduced
another kind of ignorance, and with it corresponding









is that the way in which the public forms an opinion
resembles that in which aficionados respond to works of art, or
to the work of individual artists, pop groups, or different
kinds of music. But playing on the feelings of the electorate is
also an art, and politicians whose careers in current demo-
cratic societies depend on public support are nowadays well
supported also by experts in the art of tweaking, tilting
or ‘spinning’ accounts of the events they wish their constitu-
encies, whether local or national, to respond to. They are able
to play on feelings, of fear, insecurity, national pride, a sense
of national mission. These people, the new grandees, have the
advantage over their voters of an insider’s comprehensive
insight into the many interests that political life must cater to.
Or, perhaps nearer the truth, the advantage they have is that of
being able to produce their own simplified version of this
insight for popular consumption. Another possibility, equally
sinister, is that they do not have such a comprehensive insight
and are in fact at the mercy of powers over which they them-
selves have no insight, or if insight, little control. In that case it
is not they, but those controlling the forces of capital, who are
the modern equivalent of Hume’s grandees, and our own
‘commonwealth’ is an illusion. But the true grandees might
also be the forces themselves, over which there is little if any
control.
Whatever the case here, even if the public as such is
excluded from political proceedings, it is clear that public
opinion is vital to those proceedings. It is vital in the sense that
those engaged in them require some backing for something
the electorate should be able to take for granted, namely that
it is the public’s interests that they serve. However, it is equally
clear from what has just been said that the public’s opinion









the days when free speech was still something to be fought
for were intended as organs of public information and debate.
Now they come under the general rubric of ‘image manage-
ment’, one of whose branches is to manage consensus,
another to promote a consumer culture that keeps the public











In western societies privacy is at a premium. It is what people
want and expect governments to provide. Historically that is
strange since originally ‘privacy’ (in Latin privatio) meant
‘deprivation’, or more simply, ‘privation’. Thus the sense of
the predicate ‘private’ is originally that of having had some-
thing significant taken away. This would be the more obvious
if the accent were put on the second syllable. For the Romans,
privacy or being private straightforwardly meant being out of
public office, or not yet in it. As Dewey notes, ‘etymologically
“private” is defined in opposition to “official” ’, and he adds,
‘a private person being one deprived of public position’.1
This sense lingers on only faintly today. Private members of
the British House of Commons are not in public office but on
the other hand private secretaries somehow are. Why is it,
then, that in modern societies privacy has become almost a
holy concept, something to live and die for, and certainly
something everyone wants to keep?
Privacy was once classically defined as the ‘general right to
be let alone’.2 The USA, more than any other nation, has
underlined this right and protecting it is the generally
accepted first aim of its government. So long as the private
domain is secured, first of all behind the private front door or









much who does the governing. That is because an implicit
plank in any party programme is that, even abroad, literally as
well as merely beyond the front door, privacy is protected.
The space of free and open debate ‘out there’ on matters of
public concern is of course also of some importance, but only
to the extent that it provides the public with assurances that it
can safely pursue its legal private ends, legal to the extent that
they do not impinge on similar protection provided for the
neighbour. The public sector is a deliverer of services and
security. When catastrophe occurs, as in September 2001, the
first thought of the public is that the public sector should rally
to protect it. In general, such a public is more sensitive to the
ways in which firefighters, airport police, secret-service agen-
cies, and so on, minimize threats to its private domain than to
the composition and political attitudes of the government
itself.
A population made to feel fearful for the safety of a privacy
to which it is ideologically attached or in which it has a deep
psychological investment, also lends a sympathetic ear to calls
for stricter regulations to reinforce that safety, even at the cost
of ideals of which the population boasts; the same goes for
calls to arms in defence of the nation whose integrity is
needed to provide protection for its private way of life. There
is some hint of panic, or pathology, here, in the way that
normal requirements of critical judgement are so easily set
aside, and in the speed with which ideals dear to the popula-
tion are overridden. The same is evident in a popular
tendency to acquiesce in a government’s policies of non-
involvement when fears for the nation are not invoked. Such
arguments as that intervention could make things worse, is
likely to damage interests abroad or has too little voter support









is too little to suggest something rotten in popular political
psychology, it is at least evident that the centrality of privacy
in western culture makes for clear weak spots, both in the
society and in its system of government. Diverting attention
away from the system of government itself, which is assigned
a merely instrumental role, has the effect of emptying the
public sphere and allowing its omnipresent re-occupation by
a powerful controlling system that forms a private sphere of
its own.
The situation has interesting parallels with one which a
philosopher described some two hundred years ago. He spoke
of a ‘life . . . restricted to the proper maintenance of one’s
property, a contemplation and enjoyment of one’s totally
subservient little world’. He was characterizing the old regime
in Germany, as he saw it a world made up of a multiplicity of
private lives and no real public life. It was a particularistic world
which offered no foothold for a sense of participation in a
whole.3 More especially, he saw the particularism carried over
to government too. His criticism was that the state institutions
which, in a well-organized state, should express the whole,
and which the denizens of the private worlds could acquire a
sense of in the services they performed for the public, in the
old regime formed just another private world of its own, the
isolated world of the rulers.
Not so different from the situation we have been describ-
ing? It may seem so. The old regime may have arrived there
from another direction, and the solution that Hegel – for it
was he – proposed may follow too closely the contours of the
Prussian monarchy of his day to find wide support in ours. But
one important similarity, however little obvious at first sight,
is revealing. In an early aphorism Hegel remarked on what












were ‘no longer frequented’. He objected that having become
‘bored by the public . . . [o]n s’assemble en famille . . .’. These
spaces were ‘balls, public places, the theatre’.4
In another comment on the ‘privative’ sense of the term
‘private’, Hannah Arendt has said more recently that ‘[t]o live
an entirely private life means above all to be deprived of
things essential to a truly human life’. Now, we might think,
given our media world in which shared location means so
little for communication, that what she takes us to have lost is
presently well on the way to being restored. What we lose, she
says, is ‘the reality that comes from being seen and heard by
others’. Losing that, she claims, deprives us of an ‘objective’
relationship with these others, one that ‘comes from being
related to and separated from them through the intermediary
of a common world of things’.5 But again, some may say that
a practically unlimited world of things is now being made
available to all on the Internet. There are even those who
see the promise of a new kind of social reality in virtual
communities in cyberspace.6
Quite apart from these possibilities made possible by
media innovations, we can also point to a vast expansion
nowadays, in both size and number, of the spaces where
people actually do meet in public.
On closer inspection, however, no matter how crowded
these spaces can be, they hardly provide that sense of con-
spicuous social celebration Hegel would have liked to find in
the public places he saw deserted. Think of discothèques,
pop concerts, football matches and even pedestrian precincts.
Whatever sense of immersion in forms of collective enthusi-
asm or sheer release from loneliness these can offer, they
provide nothing like the paradigms of social participation the









is prohibited by the sheer level of noise; at pop concerts the
crowd and heady atmosphere are simply part of the enter-
tainment that each ticket-holder seeks for him- or herself –
community spirit, if any, is a privilege of the fan club, though
even there jealousies can tend to separate the membership. As
for any incipient or actual sociality that may once have sought
a footing in the streets and pavements, or bus stations and
airport lounges for that matter, this is now effectively drained
by a mobile-phone habit that not only turns people away
from the space they share but, with its unnatural loudness,
even disturbs all opportunity for silent soliloquy, or any sense
of silent community, to say nothing of quiet conversation,
among the technologically under-equipped.
This account may sound jaundiced. It will do so particu-
larly to those who enjoy or contribute to forms and levels of
community spirit that nevertheless survive in our world. To
those it may be replied, however, that these, too, frequently
take the form of private islands in a wider population. They
certainly fall far short of what Hegel required of collective
celebration. His way out of his uncollected archipelago of
island-worlds, with the rulers occupying just another island,
was to try to establish and vindicate a sense of deep national
or political cohesion, felt even at the private level. Typically for
him, he saw the promise of it in a feature of the unsatisfactory
situation itself. This was the fervour with which people culti-
vated their particular worlds, an eagerness wholly out of
proportion to what good sense would tell them these worlds
could offer by way of fulfilled lives. It was a case of displaced
energy, and carrying on as if these worlds themselves could
provide such fulfilment was something Hegel called ‘bad
consciousness’: a matter of treating what is merely ephemeral












the conflict between means and end, a better idea of the
nature of fulfilment would gradually find a footing.
However we judge Hegel’s diagnosis and cure, we easily
see how far modern life has outgrown whatever chances it
may once have had of filling public spaces with anything like
what Hegel found lacking there. For all its ubiquity, our public
is politically anonymous. And in spite of attempts in theory
and through media presentation to bring about the appear-
ance of popular rule, it is hard to deny that rulers today are in
practice as remote as in the old regime itself. There may be
hidden bridges, but despite appearances, the traffic along
them goes essentially in one direction.
Several significant developments distinguish our society
from the one Hegel criticizes. First, any modern counterpart
of the old regime must preserve the appearance of democracy.
However, since the public is inclined in any case to leave
things to the rulers, while the latter have the facilities to create
the illusion that the public is nevertheless in on the game, the
possibility remains that the actual situation differs less than it
does on the surface. Second, unlike the private worlds of the
late eighteenth century, ours have become sanctuaries from
whose ‘privacy’ we are able to lead sedentary public lives all
the same, socially as well as politically, simply by pressing
buttons. We socialize from the sofa by telephone, we are
members of various publics in the sense adumbrated earlier,
by being entertained and sometimes educated as audiences of
whatever gets piped into our homes. There is justification for
the coinage ‘infotainment’, and the infotainers include the
self-interested caretakers (as well as assassins) of political
careers. Third, Hegel talks of people withdrawing from public
life into their families. In his time these were the ultimate









formed by a family was a precursor of the rational form of
organic unity that Hegel assumed would be provided by the
state. Indeed marriage itself in the context of Hegelian soci-
ety, besides calling for a socially binding divine blessing, also
implied possession of private property. Property was not just
a privilege, or a playground or a refuge from public life, but
an ethical investment in an ongoing social order. It gave that
order’s inhabitants the power to influence the state on the
state’s terms, but also on their side the means collectively to
express their humanity.8 Without such an investment a person
was merely an ‘abstract’ outsider – in a sense not far from
Lippmann’s except that for him it is a matter not of property
but of expertise: what makes the outsider is the fact that the
skills required to direct public affairs are beyond the ordinary
citizen’s reach.
Our world differs radically from the one Hegel envisaged.
For one thing, our public space is one in which careers can be
cut out, business empires built, travel and entertainment
opportunities exploited, a place for adventure, competition
and self-display. It is also the platform on which to enjoy the
corresponding rewards, which include wealth, public
acclaim, even stardom. And in a rental world of easy mobility,
where ownership tends to be corporate and taxable real estate
no longer the expression, or original site, it once was (or
taken to be) of the individual’s humanity, alternative fulfil-
ments in this glittering world of ours seem everywhere
available.
The reason why the bourgeoisie, according to Hegel any-
way, withdrew into their privacies was a visible lack of real
public life. The implication is that if a real public life existed
they would have returned. What was needed to make public












project, a sense that it was reckoned a public space filled with
public life should provide.
The picture of our own society is quite another. It is of a
society in which privacy is protected from public life. Being
private is what people want positively to be. Whatever interest
there is in public life is more than satisfied by what is relayed
to them in their homes. As for what lies outside, that is where
the modern public seeks relief from the boredom of privacy
confined to the home. Public space, both physical and
abstract, is a playground to which it can escape but is in reality
no more than an extension of its private sphere; the forms of
fulfilment it offers have nothing evidently to do with collective
expressions of humanity. In the forum or elsewhere, once in
the great outdoors private citizens remain essentially private.
As for restoring private–public ties, even if that was
desired the prospects would seem far more dismal to us than
they did to Hegel. Within Prussia’s small compass, Hegel
could envisage reinstating a sense of participation in the
whole by providing meaningful places in a state where a sense
of its multi-participatory organization was also a part of the
self-awareness of those who occupied the places. Under such
conditions, in which membership had such a clear profile, it
was easy to identify outsiders and to grasp in what way they
were abstract. In ‘larger’ governments and a globalizing world
it is first of all the ‘community’ and not the individual that
becomes increasingly abstract.
But Hegelians would say that the priority here can be
explained by the fact that our individual does not need
increasingly to become abstract; in lacking an investment in
the state the individual is that already. If outsiders were once
fairly easy to detect – apart from the outlaws, they were those









freeholders but for some reason owned no such property – in
today’s societies (and we are referring throughout only to
western societies) no such obvious footholds are on offer to
the public as such for a personal sense of participation and
responsibility. We are then, in effect, at the outset, all of us
outsiders. Worse, we are outsiders within an invisible net-
work, but in respect of it we are insiders with no control.
Instead of the citizen having an investment, the citizen is an
investment, an investment handled by the economic powers
that determine the safe future of the state, which in turn
pampers and protects those privacies upon whose consumerist
possibilities and habits its sponsors depend. In so far as the
private citizen is the investment, what reaping the rewards of
that investment requires is the continual expansion of the













Privacy and the Media
Six
The emptiness of public space goes together with the
abstractness of the private citizen. They are indeed two sides
of the same coin. What makes the individual abstract is lack of
a sense of anything out of which it has grown and has its
current being; what the space is emptied of are manifestations
of allegiance to a nation state. Both absences are easily lost
sight of in this pampering of the private citizen. There is so
much ‘out there’ that can be done, things to be busy about,
possibilities to realize. In order to grasp the abstractness we
have to see what has been lost in the way of acquiring possi-
bilities. Technology has brought to our fingertips a range of
facile skills each of which we would earlier have had to rely
on others to provide. Those who provided it, in order to have
secured these skills, would have had to undergo a long and
specialized apprenticeship. The abstraction, here, lies in
this removal of opportunities to develop professional trade
identities. Specialized skills rooted in local traditions were
once recognizable niches that people could inhabit as
respected servants of the community. Now that the ‘skills’ are
universal, easy to acquire and learned from scratch, they come
without roots. When we venture out into the world we have
no background.









education quite generally. It does not mean beginning at the
beginning, as the expression suggests. It means programming
education to introduce the pupil or student to a world of
thought the main features of which are already fixed and lie
there packaged ready for anyone to assimilate. To be effect-
ively taught, a learner is first unburdened of whatever ideas or
traditions are not in the package, and which might therefore
stand in the way of the efficient programming that it is the
aim of education itself to become. Thus what beginning from
scratch means here, for those who do have backgrounds, is
beginning over again. The result is that in the ever-growing
numbers of multicultural nations there is a trend towards
uniformity that requires at the same time the draining away of
all ethnic and cultural diversity.
In the telltale media branch of a globalizing world, this
abstraction is paraded as a virtue. It offers icons of a new
global urbanity like that of the Armani-suited Master Card-
carrying executive, equally at home in any conceivable
environment. Should the thought of being a credit-card-
carrying globetrotter versed in adult pleasure not appeal to us,
other icons are available, for example, deserts and endless
horizons for moody misfits. More poignant are those abstract
advertisers’ icons made from living public heroes. Any hint of
personality these stars may or may not personally possess is
studiously ignored to give place to the multiple consumer-
directed poses in which they are made to appear. A clearer
case of universality bought at the expense of personality
would be hard to find.
The monetary metaphor is apt, now that the discussion
enters upon the world of the media (film, television, radio,
the Internet and the press). Today, though in its niche-













marketable commodity, though what is meant by personality
is something else: a public persona. Personae are not actual
persons but masks behind which real persons are made to
appear, or make themselves appear, before their audiences or
publics. Personality in this sense is part of a vast and complex
interchange between private and public, an interchange in
which the public in its privacy seeks to escape public
anonymity.
In the vacuum left by the unavailability of niche-supported
personality, what is more natural than that, in searching for
replacements, the abstract individual should look for
opportunities in public space. We are reminded of the
thought that public space offers itself as an arena where indi-
viduals may form audiences (in fact innumerable audiences
or publics) and where, in a competitive minority of cases,
they may also become the kind of public property – the word
‘celebrity’ comes to mind – that itself attracts audiences.
Whatever else it may be besides, public space is a space of
player-audience opportunities, and as one would expect of
this particular relationship, it is a space that is biased heavily
in favour of the audience.
There need be nothing sinister in that. An audience is not
simply passive, and its members can learn as well as be enter-
tained. We reminded ourselves earlier that there is something
called audience participation and must bear in mind that
audiences are formed in response to something that awakens
in them. As for players, in our media-drenched world where
web-site homes are readily available, in principle almost any-
one in their search for an audience can indulge in this harm-
less form of self-advertisement. Some of the things that can go
wrong have been extensively discussed through the years.









are and how we appear to be to others. If a significant amount
of pressure is put on people to sustain public masks but these
deviate significantly from the persons they are to their friends
and at home, or if the effort required to cultivate and sustain
such masks means they have no real opportunity to acquire
stable personalities of their own, with the consequence that
the public persona takes over and does service as a private
one, then the health of a society that produces such pressures
may be put in question.
It is also widely agreed that in order to become reasonably
stable selves privately, we need to be accepted and recognized
by others for the qualities we acquire and on which our
(quite complex) sense of who or what we are is built. Even if
it is true that, as a rule, we inherit from our environment the
expectations we have of ourselves, this potentially stabilizing
fact can also prevent our raising ourselves to a level where any
stability gained is due more to our own acceptance of our-
selves in the roles than to the environment. The general point
is that selfhood is contingent on the kinds of relationships a
society provides and these are mirrored in, or as we could
equally say, these mirror the state of the public/private nexus
as it is found in a society at any given period. A political
arrangement or a culture that freezes the nexus or is biased
too heavily towards the public will be detrimental to the kind
of growth of personality that many assume privacy-based
societies such as ours are designed to promote.1
A hypothesis worth considering is that a media-filled public
space usurps functions that should be part of the individual’s
own hard and long apprenticeship with life. It puts external-
ities, outward appearances, in the way of an inner develop-
ment. It prevents the kind of coming to terms with life that













earned them a place of respect in society. This is not the place
to attempt a vindication of any such hypothesis, or to rehearse
others’ vindications of this or similar theories. But we may
offer some of the terms in which it, or something close to its
critical spirit, might be defended.
Take first the notion of space itself as a window in which
players can be put on display. In the days of classic Hollywood
films this space was limited. Too many players would cheapen
the ‘star value’ of each. The movie moguls were therefore
careful not to market too many personalities at a time.2 In
today’s world of mass visual communication, especially tele-
vision with its multiple audiences, the space is almost limit-
less. Stars designed to appeal to these audiences are constantly
in demand, and the slots they fill, once they or their audiences
fade, are constantly refilled by new ‘personalities’. Simply
proving one’s talent has never been enough to secure the
opportunity to appear on stage; today one fears it may seldom
even be necessary. Talent-spotters with an eye to what can be
dressed up in the way required will make sure the supply is
kept up, so that the audience can be kept in place and the
wheels of the entertainment industry greased and rolling.
If the expansion of the space might be thought to work to
the democratic advantage of the gifted, allowing more of
them to display their talent, the recording industry in fact
works in the opposite direction. Like its Hollywood forebears,
it finds that the fewer the names the audiences can aggregate
themselves behind, the greater the overall aggregate. And it
doesn’t help the aspiring player that, for perhaps not
altogether inscrutable reasons, the public shows a strong
loyalty to the (in some branches not too long) dead. This
might be looked on as a form of editorial processing ensuring









of restrictions placed on use of this public space when it was
confined to the written word and the few outlets available to
popular journalism. Those restrictions would in most cases
also be self-imposed. For people using that space, to appear in
it was something like taking a weekend stroll in public. One
put on one’s Sunday best: what was offered to the reading
public had to be well written and worth reading. It being
otherwise would reflect back both on authors and editors.
Office doors could be knocked on and persons found inside
who were accountable for what was published. If that is still
true of the writing profession in spite of the infinite expan-
sion of the space, the offerings of the media in general reflect
more on what market surveys predict that audiences will want
than on what a self-cultivated talent can provide. As for the
Internet, among the many functions of the Super Information
Highway is its provision of unlimited space for unedited
advertisement and self-expression. The fact that it relieves
players of the need to expose their performances and products
to any processes of editorial selection, freeing the public
player from restrictions that can also work unfairly, allows
one to claim that the Internet serves an undeniably demo-
cratic purpose.3 But the sheer volume of unscreened material
that it makes available, as well as the fact that finding anything
of value or interest becomes a matter of chance, means that
the information seeker is made to resemble the poor scraping
for items of value in a mountain of refuse.
Sure enough, the information supplied to our screens via
news agencies and broadcasting companies is edited. It is very
carefully edited, but the content and style of these cutely
framed reports are dictated by a market-driven need to mono-
polize as much of the available audience (or space) as possible.













stereotype and attention-attracting novelty and crisis. It does
so in order to sell itself, as well as for the journalists them-
selves to make careers, perhaps finally earning their own tele-
vision talk shows. The talk shows themselves typically exploit
bare items of current gossip, or recently acquired common
knowledge, to make jokes at the expense of public figures,
and for celebrities – exploiting just another form of publicity
– to reveal yet another mask, a friendly and approachable one,
under the thinly veiled pretence that it is the real selves behind
the public masks they are revealing. The host quips, the
studio audience whistles and laughs on cue and a worldwide
television audience joins in.
Exaggeration? Certainly. If this consistently negative view
of things is not supplemented by an account of the excellence
and indispensability of much journalism and undoubted
advantages offered by the Internet, it must itself be labelled a
stereotype. Criticism of the media is a common enough
occupation. Some may take it to indicate that matters are
under control. But in the media themselves, on which most of
us depend for our information about events ‘out there’, such
criticism simply tends to become yet another event to be
delivered to a captive audience.
Where else then can it be voiced? Frequently, the motiv-
ation conveyed to the public for such criticism, sometimes
even promoted as a form of self-criticism, though only
because the critic is a member of the same lodge, so to speak,
is the desire to protect privacy. In our society that is just the
sort of thing we would speak out for. But how widely the
private freedom that the media are nowadays attacked for
invading differs from the freedoms the press once campaigned
to make possible by fighting for its own freedom. That









repressive power, an ideal that fortunately survives in investi-
gative journalism. Today, when we criticize the press for inva-
sions of privacy, the criticism itself is reported in the press
and offered to the reader as an opportunity for schadenfreude,
which then attracts its own audience. Discomfiture among the
celebrated has always been a popular source of entertainment,
but never more so than today. We need celebrity in others,
and not having it ourselves, we like to see those who do have
it in difficulties. Whether envy or a scorn typical of a con-
sciously non-deferential society, these are not fine feelings,
and disrespect easily becomes a way of life.
There is nothing new in the claim that the media lift us out
of the real world into a world of easily digested stereotypes.
But the extent of the removal is perhaps not fully appreciated.
Instead of locating us where the action is, the media leave us
with no real sense of location at all. Not having it we are
unable to share in what we are shown. As the television
camera closes slowly in on the stony face about to break down
in grief and dwells there until it does so, we are brought no
closer to grief itself. When the face crumbles and the tears
appear in close up we either think, ‘I can’t stand it’ and turn
to another channel, or merely note once again that much is
wrong with the world and wait for the more cheerful item
bound to follow. That this conforms with our hypothesis that
a media-filled public space puts outward appearances in the
way of an inner development is easy to see. No genuine
feelings are evoked or can be cultivated by brief cuts showing
the reactions of strangers in conditions of misery. At most
one can either gaze in helpless fascination or relive the profes-
sional distance of the cameraman taking the shots. If the two














The same desensitization, or emotional pacification, of the
observer is brought about by the constant repetition that is a
feature of televisual imagery. What was real and made our
hearts jump becomes mere illustration. That first sight of two
large passenger jets plunging into each of the Twin Towers
left an indelible image. Especially the second, since then it
was clear there was no mistake. If incredulity was the first
reaction, on the part both of eyewitnesses and of television
viewers, subsequent images invoked horror rather than dis-
belief. We saw people, not just bodies, falling from their office
windows and pedestrians fleeing clouds of dust as the metal
frames melted under a heat they were not designed to resist.
The images haunt us even now, when the initial horror is less
easy to recapture. Yet, today that image of the jets is a standard
‘visual aid’ to almost any television mention of 11 September,
just as close-ups of a syringe penetrating an arm accompany
almost any reporting of matters medical. But what is now a
movie sequence, from which the horror is erased, belongs to
a train of events that of this date still produces its horrific
images, among them that of a wired-up and hooded prisoner.
That particular image now serves, too, as a regular back-
ground to discussions of atrocities on Iraqi detainees per-
petrated by the US military. The sense of outrage may linger
for a long time, and through public opinion it has its remedial
effects, but the image itself is already just part of the television
journalist’s stock in trade. No doubt it will soon appear in
glossy collections as well as in history books to come.
But if a tendency in the expansion of public space, noted
here, is to discourage and even exclude active participation,
the same public space is also one into which people can
actually vanish. How so? Isn’t the great ‘out there’ just where









some lasting mark on the world, speak and listen to each
other?
That we can, literally speaking, merge with a crowd is
obvious enough. We can escape notice by doing that, what-
ever the reasons. Where someone is being openly persecuted,
you may merge with the crowd in order not to suffer the
same treatment. In a more abstract sense you can do the same
by not coming out and defending someone in public. You
may, out of envy perhaps, hold back your praise of someone.
You may even merge with the crowd when you agree with it,
for instance letting the crowd’s criticism do for your own or
in general when you want to support a view but hold your
support of it secret. In a society as privacy-based as ours the
best way in public to avoid threats to privacy will always be to
merge with the public, to toe the line, to be invisible in
thought and habit – whether this means dressing and think-
ing in office grey or adopting some garish trend in some
circles where office grey would be conspicuously out of place.
However, there is also a sense in which it is oneself that gets
lost in the crowd. The above examples may even be seen as
cases in point. One way of losing yourself in the crowd is to
be so infected by its opinions as to come to hold them in
respect of an opinion you would not have held had you not
joined the crowd, and which, freeing yourself from the
crowd, you come to realize was a foolish opinion. Something
like this seems to happen in late-night television talk shows.
In responding in unison, whether spontaneously or on cue, to
the host, the individuals who elect or are chosen to form the
studio audience cease to behave as individuals. In becoming
the obedient audience of an expert nudge-and-wink artist,
they merge with each other in a way that their numbers and













want, or the ticket office can do that. But the count doesn’t
mean anything since in fact no ‘one’ is there. Even if a count-
able number of seats are filled, the private citizens who found
their way to the studio have vanished, along with their indi-
vidualities, into this audience. As for those artists themselves,
the talk-show hosts, they are not really there either, hiding
as they do behind carefully constructed exteriors. But the
more significant aspect of the talk show is the opportunity
it provides for the expression of opinions without being
personally accountable for them. It offers a perfect setting for
someone wishing to invoke popular opinions, attitudes, or
prejudices without taking personal responsibility for them.
After all, it is only entertainment. It is as such that the talk
show also provides a safe venue for the vulgar put-down.
As illustrations of the negative nature of the influence of
the media on personal development, these analogies may
seem too special for the purpose. It can also be objected that
they are over-described: people surely retain their identities
when they become members of audiences, even of studio
audiences that laugh or applaud on cue; while, to their audi-
ences before the television and in the studio alike, the talk-
show hosts are, and know they are, just one among many
means of diversion available to a modern public.
Let both points stand. What the cases illustrate, whether the
reader agrees or disagrees that they also exemplify them, are
ways in which, in the generation of what is called public
opinion, the expansion of public space through the media
discourages personal engagement. It does so almost to the
same extent that it encourages mental passivity. Two negative
consequences are, first, opinion is generated by forces beyond
the individual’s control, and second, the individual is denied









latter are conditions of the ability to ascend to a level of
judgement of the kind that Hume called ‘general opinion’.
As for public opinion, it was hinted that this notion, like
that of the public as a body, is used almost exclusively by
journalists or their readers, among these of course also politi-
cians sensitive to public support. ‘Public opinion’ easily con-
jures up images of groups of people murmuring, shaking
their heads, and occasionally frowning in the direction of the
government. It is more realistically cashed out into notions of
individuals separately or in small groups, very occasionally or
over longer periods and in somewhat half-hearted ways,
forming decisions about how to vote at the next election – or
more urgently but seldom, about whether to demonstrate or
even join or, if authorized, call a strike. Probably only then is
there any calculation, in the public itself and the press (with
assistance from the media’s statisticians), as to how many
share a certain salient view. Frequently the basis, if any, in a
population for claims made by interviewers who begin with
expressions like ‘people are saying . . .’, or ‘there is a general
feeling that . . .’, ‘what of the suspicion that . . .?’, etc. is
owing to what journalists themselves have already attributed
in print to ‘the public’. Their audience is composed of indi-
vidual readers, who then ‘disappear’ individually into an
anonymous acceptance of what they have read. In a world
where journalism commands so much attention, more often
than not what is called public opinion is a product of what
journalists themselves say to one another when they meet at
the bar.
Well, why not? Aren’t they, too, members of the public?
Indeed, being such well-informed, especially privileged
members, is it not right in a way that we should regard













whatever it says on its own account, signed as it were in its
own name, can be said to represent the public’s opinion. The
reason is that the opinions propagated in the press, whether
anonymously or signed by respected journalists, are just as
much responsible for forming those audiences that acquiesce
in such published opinions, and by the same token for forming
the public that acquires them, as they are reflections of what











In April 2003, several US soldiers died in a helicopter crash
on the east coast of the United States. The President and the
press called them heroes and they were given the burial with
full military honours which that status requires. Why, you
might ask, when US soldiers die in what, from a journalistic
point of view, are high enough numbers but before seeing
combat, are they described as heroes? It sounds as though
new meaning were being given to the phrase ‘jumping the
gun’. In connection with that you might ask why the suicidal
acts of desperate young men and women elsewhere, with no
army to defend them, not only cannot qualify them for that
status, but instead earn them the vilifying label of ‘terrorists’.
It may also occur to you that if nations with armies choose to
perform acts of personal vengeance in the name of the nation,
the guaranteed collateral damage that is always taken into the
reckoning makes that choice already – except under the anti-
quated rites and jargon of warfare – tantamount to premedi-
tated murder. Should not sound common sense tell us that the
helicopter crash prevented potential accomplices to murder
being party to crime?
But whose common sense? Isn’t it a truism that what
strikes some people as common sense others see, equally









rhetoric, or ‘spin’? How can we be sure the revised readings
suggested here are nearer the truth? What is common sense to
one person is not common sense to another.
A case may be made for a common sense nevertheless,
properly so-called, a vantage point from which alternative
descriptions and evaluations to those just cited come into
view. To a large extent, habits and rites of praise and blame,
habits and rites reinforced in the public by governmental
rhetoric and the media, may be seen for what they are. The
jargon can be uncovered for what it is and euphemisms and
the opposite replaced by a more literal truth.
But then again, what is to count as literal truth? Are not all
descriptions to some extent readings and replaceable? No
doubt. The case for a common sense will be more compelling
if defended on behalf of an ability not so much to arrive at
truth as to form a certain kind of critical judgement. Earlier
we distinguished two notions: a general opinion as the product
of a state of mind congenial to making judgements, and pub-
lic opinion as a disposition to feel strongly about some topic
that is brought to attention in the public sphere. The common
sense we need is to be identified more closely with the for-
mer. In making a case for a common sense, we would there-
fore be joining forces with Hume in his appeal to general
opinion, something in respect of which as, quoted earlier, ‘in
all questions with regard to morals, as well as criticism there
is no other standard by which any controversy can be
decided’.1 The proposal would be that a critical common
sense does enable us to distinguish between less and more
distorted versions of what happens in the world.
What is this vantage point, how does one arrive at it, and
how would you know that you have done so? There is no easy









more or less integral to the way we perceive our society, in
the way suggested by Taylor’s discussion of social imaginaries,
referred to earlier,2 then one answer to what the vantage point
is would be that it is a position, within the society, from
which its view of itself has become explicit. As for arriving at
that position, perhaps no one can. It is not that panoptical
vision notoriously leaves out the point of view of the viewer;
on the contrary, the danger in this case is that the point of
view of the viewer is necessarily partial and obscures what
would seem evident from the points of view of others. For
instance, the verdicts on the illustrations given here may be
revisable in the light of views from somewhere else. The
only test may be that of time. We must wait and see what
judgements claiming to state more literal truths catch the
imaginations of many people.
A more difficult problem is the practical one of getting a
hearing for such judgements. By definition almost, the more
literal truths are not in great demand, since if they were, there
would be a tendency for opinion to converge on them. The
problem is that, as we noted earlier, public opinion resembles
far less what you would expect of an appeal to Humean general
opinion than it does those potentially disruptive tides and
currents of popular mood. Today the factions Hume feared
have been largely domesticated in the form of party politics,
replaced by what is now universally referred to as ‘terror’, a
theme we will return to. As for the divided opinions that are
now typically represented in differences of party programme,
we may note how often the way public opinion behaves is
described in the press in terms of ‘surges’, for instance of
support for the President or the Prime Minister, which can











The reasons for this are many. Part of it must be the fact that
public opinion is a response to often unpredicted historical
events. The public (meaning any number of us) is usually
taken by surprise, or its interest in and attention to looming
crisis become undivided only slowly. Lippmann crisply
remarks, ‘The public will arrive in the middle of the third act
and will leave before the last curtain, having stayed just long
enough perhaps to decide who is the hero and who the villain
of the piece’.3 The fairly regular rhythms of political life also
play their part. There is, for instance, a concentration of
appeals to the public at times of election, but a later falling off
as things either arrive at or revert to a status quo that only the
opposition will feel occupationally bound to try to disturb.
The degree of credit an elected leader initially acquires also
diminishes but does so more gradually, though its demise
may be hastened by whatever truth there is to Addison’s
adage that the public is quicker to censure than to praise. If
true, one suspects the adage too is no simple truth. Envy,
boredom, seeing through the glitter of the wrapping, evident
failure to fulfil promises (for protection, abundance, etc.),
all these very different factors may contribute. But serious
censure tends to arise only when events of certain kinds are
widely publicized, events offending some quite deeply
embedded sensibility, for instance, a revulsion at injustice.
Of many examples, the Rodney King case in Los Angeles in
1992 is fairly typical. This involved the beating up of a black
man by four white police officers, who were charged with
assault but acquitted, and where the beating was recorded on
film. Riots ensued, which only subsided when two of the
officers were later sentenced. Other cases may have less visible
flashpoints so that what a wider audience first sees is the









Angeles in 1965, which erupted after the routine arrest of a
drunk driver. Instead of tides and currents we might talk here
of disturbances due to features of the seabed causing ripples
and even larger manifestations on the surface. Stable prefer-
ences become visible as ‘waves’ when people are roused from
their civil slumbers by deeply threatening events. Even where
the instances are not physically close to home they can bring
to mind the everyday possibility of the same occurring
locally. Governments are then forced to respond not just
because riots are an inconvenience and can spread, but
because the injustice has been brought to the notice of a
world whose respect and support they are forced to retain.
Survival in modern politics often depends on preserving a
humane image on the world stage, a fact of some significance.
Suppose there were only one nation, a global state. We have
recently become very aware that censure can take the other
direction, directed at dissenters rather than leaders. This
happens typically in times of national crisis, real or unreal.
Here another stable popular preference surfaces, this time in
favour of government policy and the leadership. Subjected to
‘terror’ from an ‘axis of evil’, for example, in its anxiety a
nation will close round even a weakly supported national
leader. Censure on the part of the public now becomes a form
of treason and those who dare to oppose whatever the
government decides, or even raise questions about it, are
branded as traitors. True, there can be revulsion at such a turn.
Reasonable people will react at the anomaly of their nation,
dedicated as it is to freedom, having its citizens arrested for
wearing T-shirts emblazoned ‘peace too is patriotic’. The
existence of an American concentration camp at Guantanamo
Bay and plans to try captives and construct a death chamber










prisoners of war (captured, after all, in what is billed by the
leadership as a war on terrorism), all this can easily stir up a
‘wave’ of revulsion not unlike the one Voltaire set in motion
by informing Europe of cases like that of Jean Calas. Neverthe-
less, and to pursue the oceanographic metaphor further, in
home waters and times of national crisis the force of such
waves is broken by the built-in credit accruing in the popular
mind to the leadership. Such bias (due as much, understand-
ably, to wishful thinking as to habits of loyalty) is often
compounded by an ignorance, wilful among the public,
deliberately instilled within the state, and typically spread by
inherited distortions of history and tradition.
In order to acquire sufficient force in circumstances like
these, the waves in question must become phases in a ground-
swell that carries over to other parts of the world, to areas
unaffected by this particular bias, where the undesirable
effects of short-sighted international policies and incipient
imperialism on the part of one nation can be hindered by
popular opinion in others. One powerful argument against
political globalization, then, is the need to retain an effectively
censorious public, one that must be wider than that of a
single state.
It would be wrong, however, to think of the pressure as
exclusively top-down. As mentioned earlier, a common ten-
dency within a population is to acquiesce in a government’s
policies of non-involvement, typically from fear of upsetting
internal stability. But people may also be roused to deplore
what they see as a weak-kneed passivity inconsistent with
their own and the nation’s tough image, thus threatening to
undermine their own and the nation’s reputation. Examples
abound here too. It is generally accepted, for instance, that it









at home, and of pressure from the French president, that
President Clinton began the bombing of Serbia.4 Yet a popular
memory, selective in itself and suitably aided by the press, is
more than willing to repair such damage. The American pub-
lic may now look back on the Serbian adventure as proof of a
determination to eradicate ‘evil’ wherever it is found. We
forget that, as proof that a US-led ‘war’ on terror was not a
war on Islam, a succeeding president exploited in the guise
of a ‘defence of Muslims’ what was in effect a last-minute
decision made under popular pressure.
It may be unfortunate that due to its singular influence in
the world today the US should provide so many vivid illustra-
tions of the vagaries and weaknesses of this ‘thing’ called
public opinion. But the fact of their appearing, especially to
outsiders, so painfully evident in that context reveals some-
thing of the consequences of having to maintain a nation or
commonwealth as ‘extensive’ as the US. More than most, it is
a nation that sustains itself on its image and historical record,
in both of which it makes a heavy investment. Who, for
example, on visiting the Holocaust museum in Washington
could assume anything but that the US has a record of hands-on
opposition to known genocide abroad?
In cases like this the literal truth is too easy to discover for
us to have to talk about a privileged vantage point from which
to discern it. And that is the way it is in general. The vantage
point is reached by moving not closer to the truth but further
away. The evidence is already available but it requires a certain
kind of disengagement even to want to examine it. One must
first be willing to envisage alternatives to the view on show.
We may expect this more readily of an outsider, but then if the
outsider in one context is an insider in another, there is a










those who acquire some distance to their own political
settings. That can be either in the present or as a member of a
later public able, due to distance in time, to loosen its loyalties
to what is past. Critical outsidership in the present is some-
thing we shall return to, but one quite significant factor here
is the familiar reticence we feel compelled to maintain due to
fear that in admitting the truth we are playing into the hands
of our nation’s enemies, who will again distort the truth but
this time in the service of an unfriendly stereotype. A glaring
example is the widespread refusal in Germany today, even
among intellectuals, openly to support the Palestinian cause.
The fear, which on any plausible account of what it is to
employ one’s reason is an irrational fear though unfortunately
no less real for that, is that by doing so they will be accused of
anti-Semitism.
On the face of it, such lack of good sense appears too
absurd for the explanation to be a simple one. However there
are several things one can point to in mitigation of accusa-
tions of unreason here, including the point just made that in
making the rational point one may be playing into the hands
of those less rational. But in the remainder of this chapter, two
quite different perspectives will be outlined, each with its
characteristic perspective on unreason and how to escape it.
The former is a philosophical perspective. By that I mean a
perspective that appeals to what everyone in a properly
rational mood would be expected to assent to. It differs from
Hume’s general opinion in, at least on my reading of Hume,
supposing a specifically philosophical vantage point above the
variety of traditions.5 It may be illustrated by a now familiar
example of a well-known philosopher’s encounter with what,
for want of a better name, may be called public unreason. It is










detail. It relates to Peter Singer’s cancelled lecture tour in
Germany in 1989. Singer had been billed in June 1989 to give
a public lecture, in the university town of Marburg, on eutha-
nasia. His general thesis was to be (cautiously enough) that,
in certain circumstances, it might be ‘ethically permissible to
take active steps to end the lives of infants’. The circumstances
in question included severe disability where death is con-
sidered to be best for the infant, but also in some cases where
consideration can be taken of the family as a whole (for
example where there is no acceptable alternative to the child
staying with the family).6 The lecture was to be part of a
symposium entitled ‘Bioengineering, Ethics and Mental
Disability’ under the auspices of two large organizations for
parents of intellectually disabled infants. However, these
organizations were put under pressure to cancel their invita-
tion to Singer, on the grounds that although his views might
be discussed in closed academic circles, he should not be
allowed to promote them in public.
The point made by those opposing the debate was that,
although in the interests of freedom of speech it should be
allowed to go ahead in spite of their distaste for the topic,
it was one that should be aired behind closed doors and
according to the special conventions of philosophical debate.
There are several reasons in favour of such a forum. The con-
ditions there are of a kind in which opposition can be effect-
ively made, something that may easily not be the case when
opposition is in the hands of people unschooled in debate.
There is also that matter of disengagement. In academic
circles, the way you address a topic matters as much as, if
indeed not more than, the topic itself or indeed the outcome.












What harm? For those who opposed the position in
principle it would be the position’s actually coming to be
accepted. They might harbour deep scruples about taking life
in general, or more strategically, see this as the thin end of a
wedge that could end in old-fashioned eugenics. Others
might cite a quite different danger: the position being
accepted under the persuasive influence of an apparently
rational discussion but in which the idea of rationality and the
rules of debate associated with it gave Singer an unfair advan-
tage. The fear would be that other sources of insight relevant
to such an important issue would have no chance to take
effect, a chance which in the interests of truth they should be
given. We will return to this.
Singer sees it in another light. The harm he found himself
forced to consider was one he believed he should not really
have to consider. It was what some (or enough) people
thought might all too easily arise just from him presenting his
thesis, even though it was the cautious one mentioned. Simply
proposing it might refresh grim memories of the conse-
quences of the Nazi euthanasia programme and could even be
exploited, if not intended, as an attempt to steer people’s
minds back in the same direction. It was in fact the public
identification of Singer’s philosophically argued conclusion
with Nazi malpractices in the recent past that brought about
the widespread demand that the invitation be cancelled. The
case is similar to that in which pro-Palestinian sentiments are
taken to be expressions of anti-Semitism. The explanation lies
in Germany itself, due to the not-so-distant Nazi past, in a
sensitivity that inclines people prejudicially to attribute views
like Singer’s to a mentality of the Nazi cast.
There are two sharply diverging ways of looking at this.










intolerance and a narrow-minded refusal to foster free intel-
lectual inquiry. As a philosopher, Singer not unsurprisingly
sees it in this light. Characteristically he also draws from the
local explanation a wider conclusion about bio-ethical
inquiry in general. ‘Bio-ethics’, he affirms, ‘is a discipline that
leads to the questioning of values and ethical doctrines . . .
previously . . . treated as sacrosanct.’ These doctrines he takes
to be linked closely to religious beliefs. Intolerance of free
discussion has moreover a broad political basis which permits
more subtle ways of preventing the spread of free bio-ethical
discussion, for example restrictions on funding. Singer
concludes:
There is a clear need to develop a broader appreciation of the
importance of an atmosphere of support for rational
discussion of controversial ideas, in bioethics and
elsewhere. One step towards doing this would be an
institutional means – such as an international association of
bioethics – which could show the united support of
bioethicists from all over the world, whatever their views, for
the right to discuss freely issues in bioethics.7
It is interesting that while Singer’s opponents linked his
position with Hitler’s Germany, he linked them with Ayatollah
Khomeini, tarring them with the brush of religious funda-
mentalism. It is important that the bio-ethicist is a phil-
osopher, not a practitioner, that is, not a physician or surgeon,
a professional facing daily the problems bio-ethicists discuss.
Bio-ethics, like other areas of applied philosophy, business
ethics for instance, employs traditional methods of reasoning
to tackle ethical dilemmas of professional and political life. It
draws on an armoury of methods established by philosophy’s











enduring moral theories. Bio-ethics has in this way contri-
buted to a public image of the philosopher as a professional
among others, and of philosophy itself as a service industry
dispensing universally applicable guidelines for ethically
acceptable behaviour. Singer’s way of seeing the situation fits
exactly this pattern. It calls for employment of the cool light
of objective reason and seeks an international forum for the
debate free from contextual interference. The perspective here
is one we find also in proposals to define truth in terms of
consensus. In political life that is an impossibility: disagree-
ment is the name of the political game and universal agree-
ment here is inconceivable. Even the attempt by philosophers
to formulate procedures that maximize the possibility of
agreement seem misconceived if they imply that truth is a
light that will shine once all in which we disagree has been
discarded as due either to lack of relevant information or else
‘darkness’. There is the idea that, given the impossibility of a
universal debate, the task of arriving at what is virtual agree-
ment can be entrusted to certain arrangements designed to
ensure that the results of actual debates, in which compara-
tively few directly engage, conform with that to which free
and equal citizens could reasonably agree. This idea, implicit
in Habermas’s notion of an ideal speech situation, designed
precisely to aim at such a consensus, sounds excellently
democratic. But it is an abstracting idea that ignores the reality
of politics and is for that reason not at all democratic.
There is, however, an alternative perspective: one from
which the opposition Singer encountered appears as some-
thing to which he himself contributed. The resistance that the
generalizing philosopher meets can be due simply to fear,
perhaps a double fear: fear of the return of a very real past that










with a fear that yet another order was being imposed on the
public, this time by a regime whose edicts are hammered out
on the anvil of a reason impervious to recent history and local
feelings.
Directing an appeal of this kind, and in such a way, to
people with complicated attitudes bound up with their history
can itself appear profoundly irrational. It is to ask people to
revise their opinions but taking no account of the nature of
the opinions themselves or of what it is that evokes and sus-
tains them. The travelling rationalist who must regard local
variation as irrelevant and ‘dark’ is a development of what
began in the attempt to protect informed debate from the
disruptive influence of unschooled popular opinion. But in a
society where education is virtually universal, popular opinion
can no longer be described as unschooled; what we have now
is a form of irrationality not of ignorance. The alternative
perspective, then, is one that adopts a common sense that sees
irrationalities for what they are and is able to judge the morality
of a society that fails to divest itself of them or to develop
from within these irrationalities. The disengagement that an
ability to see a cultural community’s moral shortcomings
requires is not a disinterested disengagement of the kind
that Dreyfus criticizes in a companion work in this series.
That would mean failing to appreciate the nature of the forces
at work in the shaping of opinion. From this other perspective
the forces may not appear so dark, and some may even appear
beneficial. With its collective gut feeling, the public may
act as a brake on what it senses – at times, it may prove,
wisely – to be facile proposals for innovation or short-term
measures designed to bring instant credit to career-minded












European resistance to gene-manipulated food may be due
not just to a mindless reliance on nature; it may be traced to a
healthy decline in a once over-confident trust in science in
general.8 Similarly in medical ethics. Popular prejudice against
surrogate motherhood and artificial insemination can be
argued against by pointing out the advantages, for instance
for infertile couples, cementing marriages in this way, and
so forth. Popular ‘prejudice’, unschooled in philosophical
forensics, might defend itself not by argument but by resort-
ing to vivid turns of phrase which put the matter in bold
relief, for instance by referring, as has been done, to ‘shop-
floor motherhood’, a metaphor specifically designed like
‘Frankenfoods’ to present the innovation in a bad light, but
which ‘progressive’ thinkers will object to as ‘darkly’ tenden-
tious and intellectually reprehensible.
The common sense we are seeking is first of all that of an
individual. It is possible from that always tenable ‘outsider’
position which modern society provides for its public. Any-
one in the aggregate public of a modern state can turn reflect-
ively away from immersion in current world-engagement to
see this engagement in a wider light. Any individual can rise
above the fog that blinds moral vision when fear of losing
what it has gained in its privacy is the primary political con-
cern. To see that the public domain has been turned into a
sector that matters only when it fails to deliver protection, to
realize the extent to which governments see their duties (easily
advertised by them to voters as protecting their private
worlds) mainly in terms of the economic survival of the
nation, to realize how this in turn calls for its continual
growth on a limited planet, and to realize that other societies
frown on the infinite economic exploitation of a finite world,










of the use of this world as a playground for protected privacies,
whether by tourists, tuned-in teenagers, or media magnates,
or even politicians with personal grudges – all this can and
has to be laid on the shoulders of the individual. There is no
other valid perspective.
By that, I of course do not mean that the world will be saved
by individuals rather than groups, by single initiatives rather
than by concerted action, of whatever kind. The point is an
epistemological one. It is about our sources of understanding,
of the depths of our individual vision, of how we can help
each other to wider and deeper understanding, and work our
way through what come to appear obvious distortions so
as to approach something that could be called a common
sense. Nor, of course, do I mean that approaching such a
sense is achieved in a state of unworldly solipsism; it arises in
the company one keeps and the experience one accumulates.
But it also requires an ability to resist lazy habits and rise
above them and to digest and re-digest one’s experience, and
to have an open eye for the kind of company one keeps.
The historian Thucydides tells how the Athenians came to
re-elect his contemporary, Pericles, as their leader in spite of
their fury at his having allowed their land to be ravaged by the
Peloponnesians. He writes that although ‘as a community’
their leader’s eloquence succeeded in assuaging their anger,
nevertheless ‘as private individuals’ they still smarted under
their losses and sufferings. It was only after he had been fined
that ‘public feeling’ against him subsided. And then, quite
soon, ‘according to the way of the multitude, they elected
him again as general and committed all their affairs into his
hands, having become less sensitive to their private and
domestic afflictions, and understanding that he was the best











It is only natural, when danger threatens, to place public
security before private redress. In our times, the dangers are
harder to pin down than for the hard-tried Athenians. They
knew who the enemy was and, in the light of no obvious
alternative, the decision to retain Pericles was reasonable. Our
own enemies face us on the pages of newspapers and in the
official mouthpieces of our leaders. By then, they tend to be
monsters of image-management and the leaders who take it
upon themselves to defend us against them hardly less so.
Occupied as we generally are with our own matters, and
‘according to the way of the multitude’, we ourselves naturally
tend to accept what we see and hear. We merge with the
multitude, not wanting to realize how little its opinions are its
and ours our own.
The common sense we need is one that allows truths to
appear that, prior to attaining its vantage point, we may not
have liked. Among these can be the realization that the forces
threatening us are partly generated by our own society. The
darkness we see abroad, and when at home as something
foreign, and which we oppose to our own light, may be an
illusion due to blindness to the effects of the aggressive and
also destructive nature of our own way of life. We may come
to realize that living in a world of protected privacy is to live
in a state of constant fear, a fear that includes the fear of
showing or even feeling it. To common sense, what we call
‘dark’ and even ‘evil’ may appear less alien to anything we can
imagine ourselves ever considering or condoning. Common
sense is not conciliation or negotiation or compromise; it is a
better sense of difference that can alleviate the pressures that
these merely presuppose. It may allow us to look with under-
standing on the desperate acts of those in other cultures who










even end up acknowledging their desperation and fear, even
grasping why tourist destinations, discothèques in Muslim
lands and sky-scraping – or heaven-storming – centres of
world trade should be their preferred targets.
If situations like Voltaire’s were repeated and an audience
created for a shared vision along these lines, that would go
some way to vindicating the claim that the sense it gives to us
of things is a ‘common’ sense. The more common it is the
better able to prevent politicians relying on self-servingly short
memories. It will be less certain that ‘in a month or a year
events will have moved along’. ‘The tyrant had to go’ will cause
fewer heads to nod, knowingly but mindlessly, when uttered,
as so often and with such finality, as an argument-stopping











Transforming the Private Sphere
Eight
So far, with regard to the public, what it means to us today is
little more than a catalogue of names – a list, merely, of those
who, according to their various backgrounds, sensibilities,
etc., may come to form more or less ephemeral aggregates
around some shared focus of concern. These can be of many
kinds, communal as well as more or less political. It seems to
be a feature of modern society indeed to develop communal
activities, locally or in groups, that for their participants have
far greater significance for their lives than any political
engagement. These projects exist at all levels from local fan
clubs to organized pilgrimages,1 from Gardener of the Year to
World Idol contests. The concerns they aggregate around can
have a political flavour when politically sensitive events are
conveyed to a sizeable enough audience. The church, in all its
forms, represents another concerted communal activity that
partly protects itself from political engagement, but addresses
politics on certain salient issues, and can in some countries,
as for instance in South America, be enduringly engaged in
political struggle. The thought was also that popular attention
is something governments employ the considerable means at
their disposal in order, as the case may be, either to exploit or
foreclose. But beyond this propensity to be roused from its










media, we have found little positive to say of the public itself.
The most said is that it is composed of citizens exploiting
their legally protected private rights to build and furnish their
privacy.
Many will say this is an inaccurate account. After all, thanks
to modern communication, today’s public is ‘in’ on most of
what happens, at least on the political surface, which is where
the kind of ‘crunch’ that concerns it eventually comes. More-
over, and this is a significant factor, regarding the processes or
procedures that lead to major political decisions there is still
some feeling at large that these decisions are made under its
surveillance, a kind of guarantee that it exercises some kind of
constant control, or even that in some indirect way there is
public agreement with what governments decide and then do.
As in ancient Rome, just by being in close touch with the deal-
ings of senators and magistrates, those who met to exchange
views in the forum were made to feel that their opinions were
acknowledged and somehow mattered, so too the publicity
that surrounds modern politicians conveys a general impres-
sion that, being similarly forged ‘under the public eye’, their
decisions are products of a popular feedback. Since criticism
is routinely expected from the side of the opposition, gov-
ernments themselves may feel encouraged to assume that, if
only public censure does not exceed expected limits, they can
take the continuing support of a ‘silent majority’ for granted.
A public with its sensory apparatus constantly keyed to a
communications network that relays policy decisions against
their daily backgrounds may for that reason feel satisfied that
it has the ‘ear’ of an audience-sensitive government.
There are other reasons too why the public may feel con-
tent with only limited ‘hands-on’ engagement in political




















Given a contractual element in the way democratic societies
understand themselves, once a government is ‘in’, it has an
authority that only in very exceptional circumstances can be
impeached. By voting it in, even that part of the public that
voted for an alternative has consented to bow to a govern-
ment’s decisions. Admittedly, in liberal democracies this
would not be used as an argument for withholding criticism
and reminding the government of its electoral promises. A
stronger excuse for giving the government its head is the idea
that its decisions should stand in any case just because they are
arrived at through procedures established to ensure as much
consensus as possible. For the procedures do not have to be
assumed to guarantee right decisions; on this procedural view
the ‘should’ here is moral and so the decision should stand
even if you think it wrong. Endorsement by the Security
Council of a policy of military intervention in Iraq would
override any political or even moral objections the individual
might have had to such a policy. Similarly if instead of failing
to reach a decision at all, the Council had endorsed a policy of
non-intervention, ways other than military force would have
to be proposed. Had the US or ‘coalition’ in those circum-
stances intervened anyway, this would have invoked moral
revulsion among many. As it happened, in the moral vacuum
left by the Security Council’s failure to reach internal agree-
ment, the US was able to adopt a superior moral stance and
accuse the United Nations of vacillation and worse.
It is clear enough, however, that when invoked in this way,
whether as a rhetorical weapon in the defence of political
decisions or as justification by the individual for not forming
his or her own judgement, morality itself assumes the guise
of a mere pawn in a game. In one case the political interests of










moral mottoes designed to appeal to an unthinking majority;
in another individuals exploit a fairly sophisticated tradition
of moral thinking to justify staying on the sidelines. In a post-
Nietzschean age like ours it has become normal to interpret
morality against a background of power relations or net-
works. For those inspired by Nietzsche himself, however, not
only the characteristic puerility and at times patent hypocrisy
of current political appeals to popular moral sense, but also
the abject delegation of political and moral responsibility to
formal procedures, must both betoken a situation in which
morality itself is conspicuously absent. A morally sensitive
public has little reason to be content with the manner or
extent of its participation in political affairs. The degree to
which the public is ‘in’ on these affairs falls far short of what
theorists have required of popular consent.
A factor Lippmann failed to account for in stressing the
distinction between outsiders and insiders is that errors of
government are not merely failures of expertise but often
lapses of common morality. That they are so is hidden usually
by the sanctity of realpolitik as the framework within which
politicians are ‘forced’ to operate. But the language used is
often designed to appeal to an electorate not so constrained.
In that case the moral terms in which the explanation is
offered must to an outsider seem entirely specious. Here is an
area where governments may cover up or try to explain away
their errors but in respect of which, as insiders, they have no
special expertise.
It nevertheless requires what in Lippmann’s terms might be
called an ‘extended outsidership’ to be in, or come into, a
position where criticism of this kind can be mounted. The
distance may be needed even for it to become evident that




















someone who is to a degree immune to the influence of
powerful and centrally disseminated narratives of the kind
issued by administrations especially in times of crisis, immune
in a way that Lippmann’s outsiders, being simply at the mercy
of insiders, will tend not to be. For reasons not at all hard to
understand, at times of national crisis the majority of citizens
tend not to be immune.
The reasons are clear enough. A multicultural as well as
geographically extended nation needs to feel secure in its
government as the protector of its integrity. Not least is this
true of a nation whose basic principle is that privacy above all
be protected. The government in its turn, in order to protect
its reputation and status in this respect, has to give the impres-
sion of being the strong guardian of the nation. It can do so,
as mentioned earlier, through a loyal and centralized press
corps disposed to provide a single story well suited to main-
taining or restoring faith in the powers that be. In so far as
they serve the principle of protected privacy in general, the
public services, too, and the military are unifying factors, to
say nothing of national sport. Heroic sporting achievements
on behalf of the nation can be celebrated locally, thus con-
necting the periphery to the centre. The fact that fallen
soldiers are buried with military honours in symbolically
national ground softens the bitterness the bereaved may feel
for their personal sacrifice, while any local resentment that
remains will in any case be voiced at a convenient distance –
something of which Hume would have recognized the
significance.
Large commonwealths based on the protection of privacy
are fragile. In one respect, the fragility is logical, simply
because privacy is at risk once the system protecting it is










often said that exposure to attack is a price that must be paid
for freedom and that it is a price worth paying. Perhaps, but
there is more to be said about freedom than that it is some-
thing worth paying that price for. The value of freedom must
ultimately be judged by what freedom achieves. It is also true
that in an important sense freedom, even when provided for,
is something that itself still remains to be achieved. The public
with its freedoms protected can be a willingly or wilfully
manipulated public. It can be a public formed of individuals
whose use of the freedom provided for falls short of the
actions and attitudes the provision was designed to foster.
The fragility may be more than logical. The enterprises
issuing from the privacies protected by the state can be read as
vain attempts to obscure the more fundamental fragility of
the human being itself. On this analysis, it is due to this that
the privacy is exploited in the way so evident today in a
consumerist society, exploited, that is, not to allow human
beings to flourish in a community, but as an opportunity to
ignore unacceptable truths about the human condition. A
consistent application of the analysis might even take the
communal activities in which people nevertheless engage on
their own initiatives, of the kind just mentioned, as diversions
designed to escape such truths.
At whatever level of analysis we begin or end, there is
something sinister in the thought that a modern public may
be impervious en masse to its shortcomings, and in its having
an investment in remaining so.
Compare this situation with that of those ‘replicants’ in the
classic movie Blade Runner. These knew their shortcomings and
wanted to overcome them. In a run-down Los Angeles in
2019, these creatures of the high-tech Tyrell Corporation, not




















return to their makers demanding an upgrading to full
human status. Indeed, what these jumpy beings, who can turn
up anywhere at any time, lack is everything human: inner
lives, emotions, histories, roots. An ex-policeman, the
eponymous blade runner, has the unenviable job of identifying
these almost-humans and ‘taking care of them’. One, Rachel,
through a photo of what she takes to be her mother acquires a
virtual memory of a past, a foot in the door so to speak. The
blade runner falls for her.
An allegory, of course, and an exaggeration. But the refer-
ence to inner history and, if only implicitly, to a capacity to
reflect and to develop powers of feeling and empathy, as well
as to a sense of something missing, or in our context lost,
speaks clearly enough to our theme. It does so in the general
area of what is usually referred to as ‘inner life’. That inner life
is a feature of the individual. It can expand or it can fail to
develop, and it can wither.
In philosophy, the individual has, for a long time, been
discussed under the category of ‘subject’, typically the per-
ceiving subject considered in opposition to, or ‘over and
against’, the perceived ‘object’. It is characteristic of much
contemporary philosophy to play down the role of the
subject, once the foundation of all philosophical reconstruc-
tions of knowledge. Descartes may well be, for all intents and
purposes, dead as far as philosophy today is concerned, and
very few will disagree with Habermas in his rejection of views
in which the ‘experiencing’ subject remains ‘the last court of
appeal’.2 Nevertheless, whatever justification there may be for
rejecting it in certain areas traditionally central to philosophy,
the idea of the experiencing subject as a final court of appeal
need by no means be dead. It can even stand as a kind of










something to reach for for those who believe better justice
can be done to the philosophy of the subject, particularly in
terms of discernment, apprehension and, not least, self-
awareness. Certainly, to dismiss the subject’s role, even in
Nietzsche, to ‘the yes and no of the palate’, as Habermas in
one place does,3 is to talk of the human subject as little more
than a replicant.
The following comments are therefore offered by way of a
proposal that this notion of a subjective court of appeal pro-
vides just the sound basis needed on which to resurrect the
role of the subject and, with it, that central figure: the
individual who is responsible for the politically influential
opinions of ‘the public’.
We may conveniently leave aside disputes about reason and
its role and possible limitations. Or rather, we may let reason
be just whatever you appeal to in support or criticism of a
proffered position. There are innumerable positions or, when
you accept them, standpoints. A standpoint is what you
express when you say why you accept or reject a certain
proposal, in our case a moral or a political proposal. There
may be no clear line to be drawn between motivation and
justification here, between what drives you to say something
and reasons you may give for your view of the matter. But
whatever people say expresses their view of where they stand,
and the kinds of considerations that occur to them, there and
then, in saying it. That this is reason enough is even more
obvious where the views are backed by professional experi-
ence. Members of the medical and legal professions, as well
as of various religious groups and sects, and committed
non-believers, with or without professional ‘philosophical’
leanings, whether as utilitarians or deontologists or com-




















To reserve the term ‘reason’ for those who think only
abstractly would be tendentious in the extreme. One may be
both a lawyer and an atheist, and even a philosopher, but it is
as a lawyer that you know your way about the world.
On the other hand, the lawyer’s vision qua lawyer is still
only partial. And the same goes for all who know their way
about in their professional domains. Is there no wider vision
available?
In this age of the death of ideologies – ‘grand narratives’ –
our social criticism tends not to be theoretical. That it is better
not so was forcefully proclaimed in Karl Popper’s The Open
Society and its Enemies (1945). With his hard criticism of the
belief in general laws of historical development, Popper’s
own proposal was that social reform should proceed by
piecemeal social engineering. But following too slavishly the
pattern of Popper’s proposed piecemeal social engineering
may be a mistake, strategically speaking. Perhaps even the very
idea of a science of society is wrong at the outset. We may
have to rise above the level of science or indeed of any of our
professions, though without losing touch with what we learn
there. A piecemeal approach can blind us to things that a
broader perspective may bring to light, thus preventing
insight into what is wrong and what is needed for change
where change is possible.
‘Seeing where things are going’, talk of ‘the tendency of
the age’, these imply a reflection, a position outside and
possibly above the age. Not inconceivably such a reflection
may be one that fails to reach up to the age, not seeing its
good points but capable only of sour criticism (‘youth no
longer respects age’, etc.). All too often critics of the present
have compared their times with a golden past. Rejection of










a utopian or at least romantic vision of the present as the
threshold to a future defined abstractly in terms of freedom,
authenticity, self-development, full use of human resources,
etc. Existentialists, Beatniks, the Hippies and Youth Culture (in
some of its aspects) have offered the promise of a way out of
what is made to appear a cheaper form of life than the one(s)
we are destined for. The conflict between environmentally
concerned liberals and globalizing capitalists is a clash between
diverging visions, each with its view of what promises to be a
catastrophic outcome of not paying heed to their message: an
impoverished nature or an unexploited richness – though the
globalizers, too, promote their plan for the future as the only
way of sustaining life on Earth, in their case in terms of
increasing prosperity. We should accept that how one sees the
age going (to the dogs or towards true freedom and self-
fulfilment) may itself depend on cultural variables defining
the forms reflection takes when it judges the age.
In the hands of philosophers such perspectival variables
can survive simultaneously in the form of conflicting tradi-
tions of thought. Hubert Dreyfus’s criticism of continuing
strains of Enlightenment thought, targeting notably Habermas,
is a case in point. Against Habermas’s hopes for the public
sphere as the space to recapture on behalf of political and
moral virtue,4 Dreyfus first levels objections that he sees
anticipated in Kierkegaard’s comments on the press, in
particular the way in which a media-filled public sphere
abstracts from the individual’s world, thus depriving people
of their footholds for individual initiative, while at the same
time protecting them in the way we have noted from any
sense of personal accountability. Where Habermas would
regard these as difficulties to overcome, Dreyfus sees them as




















Enlightenment belief in a ‘space in which the rational, dis-
interested reflection that should guide government and
human life could be institutionalized and refined’.5
Whatever the philosophers say, is it not evident to everyone
that a view of things wider than one’s personal experience,
professional or not, is generally available? By ‘anyone’ I am
not referring to the anonymous public as such, a merely
countable vote, for that is no one. I mean an individual with
experience as a player and audience. Such experience can
always be a vantage point from which to develop a reflective
expertise that is at once synoptic and based directly on hands-
on knowledge, quite unfiltered by some presupposed account
of humankind, or of what is good in the long run for
humanity.
Consider that lawyer. He or she is a member of the public,
anonymous so far except as a listed name. But ‘lawyer’ narrows
the field. So do many other labels and descriptions of the parts
played in society by this member of the public. For the lawyer,
legal experience is not the only horizon he or she works
within, and even within that sphere many other horizons
interact. As life goes on, with any quite ordinary powers of
perspective, the horizon within which the lawyer’s activities
in that role operate can widen and extend to a world in which
legal decisions also have their limits and where moral con-
siderations intrude. The same is not only possible but likely
for anyone in a position of responsibility, typically a position
in ‘public’ service, though not necessarily in the pay of the
state. As your reflective horizon expands, so does the range
and depth of your sensibility, the force of concentrated
intuition you are able to bring to bear on the actions and
utterances of those in a position to influence your own










and utterances as now visibly contravene deep-seated codes of
behaviour accepted by the society you work in. But you may
go further. You may learn to see the official versions of these
codes themselves as but poor versions of codes even more
deeply seated in the population and which you realize that
you yourself share. Sharing them with others and observing
the distance between them and the official moral jargon, you
can be part of a wider vision, and in a position to let others
share it. This is the degree, in the terms of Habermas’s
perhaps deliberately throwaway remark, to which a palate
may be developed in its power of discrimination, in its sense
of what to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to.
We gave examples earlier of revisions of standard percep-
tions of heroes and terrorists. In whatever way the events
described by using these notions may be made to appear, it is
open to any member of a society to sense, in the response to
those events, the general tenor of that society’s moral and
political attitudes. The ability to see a cultural community’s
moral shortcomings requires a certain disengagement but, as
we said earlier, not a disinterested disengagement of the sort
that Dreyfus criticizes. What is needed is a distancing on the
very basis of an engagement, from within it, and in extension
of the expertise as it were, not in feigned ignorance of it. On
the other hand, as with any personal narrative one may con-
struct in a lifetime, it typically takes an outsider to note
discrepancies between the narrative and the life itself. But
then, as we have already noted, in modern western societies
the outsider role, though it is typical as well as natural to try
to escape from it, is one we are all inherently able to adopt. It
is an uneasy position to hold, because from it everything you
are and believe can be weighed in the balance. But that there is




















We need occasionally to step aside. Or meet in some public
space where we are put in mind of how little of what we do
or achieve counts, seeing things directly and without the
interfering spins and refractions of the media or of their
influence on our current perceptions. One such place is
Ground Zero, where the Twin Towers once stood; these are to
be replaced not only by a new tower, this time of Freedom,
but also by something less rhetorical, a grove named ‘reflect-
ing absence’. It is not only a fitting symbol of the position
from which reflection over the nature and setting for human
fulfilment can take place; sight of the levelled terrain and
memory of the terrible events that caused it can free the mind
for a moment from its normally healthy addiction to the
world, an addiction that easily creates enmity and division. It
is a prospect that can produce a sense of human levelling.
Kierkegaard said that coming to the point where all you can
say positively of yourself is that you are a human being reveals
the fundamental nullity of selfhood, the ultimate anonymity,
a ground zero in which you stay put but at the same time
move on, letting it educate your everyday. He predicted we
would end up there and that it would be a good thing if
we did.
Following Kierkegaard’s diagnosis of his age as an age
given to despair, we would have to see western culture as a
massive cover-up operation, a way of diverting attention from
this fundamental nullity by conceiving ourselves ever more
creatively but desperately in worldly terms.
Whether Kierkegaard is right about despair being our basic
trait – in his version it requires some correlative notion of
faith – his belief that modern society drives us to a ground
zero that we would rather not have to visit, is one that resonates










to freedom is to avoid the issue of what freedom is and the
duties it imposes. Whether or not the physical ground zero is
rebuilt, the reflective possibility that it symbolizes is one we
all carry with us.
It is wrong to cast privacy itself in the role of evil-doer. If
privacy is bad by itself, it need not be so in itself. The confines
of our protected privacies can be just what we need. True,
‘privacy’ conjures up notions of guardedness, selfishness and
greed, even introversion and narcissism, not just intimacy and
warmth. If asked what else is needed, a usual answer will be
in terms of a concern for the interests of others. Philanthropy
and public service are candidates, but the former is confined
to the well-off and, regarding the latter, public-sector workers,
however communally motivated, tend to be people like any-
one else except for the fact that they perform overt social
functions paid for by the state, not well paid as a rule, but
with the security of a state pension.
Nevertheless, it does seem right to say that what is needed
is to be found within the private sphere, and moreover at the
level of the individual existence, of anonymity, and also that
what is needed embraces a concern for the common good. In
a society as expanded as ours, generating a sense of commu-
nity requires a sense of acute common danger from outside:
totalitarian leaders knew how to generate and preserve that
sense. To bring off the connection between private and public
in the way Hegel optimistically expected – with a society well
conscious of its participation in the whole – may indeed
require a totalitarian government. This would automatically
spell the demise of ‘the public’ in the sense that Dewey, for
instance, assumes, a public formed by individuals but also
one whose demise was predictable for other reasons. The




















today would be that it excluded the possibility we are pursuing,
which assumes that the public is in place, an indeterminate
aggregate that, until those forming it engage each others’
attention in the player-audience roles described, is totally
anonymous from any public point of view. The idea pro-
moted here is that the anonymity offers in everyone’s case a
unique opportunity to stand back and resist the seductions of











We spoke of public space, or public spaces in the plural. Not
streets, markets or pedestrian precincts, but an abstract space
formed by a shared political landscape. Historically, the
market-place does offer one example of a public space; the
Athenian agora and the Roman forum were not just bounded
physical spaces where people met, they were political arenas,
places where at least male members of society could mingle
with their representatives, senators, and other important
political figures. But the ancient market-place has no true suc-
cessors in the vastly expanded societies of today. The closest
analogue is to be found in the corridors of power where the
press, not the people, meet the powers that be, sometimes
directly but more often through official briefings and carefully
crafted communiqués.
Some people see in the expanding media a possibility of
politically fruitful interaction between peoples and their
representatives. The Internet is even presented as a worldwide
electronic agora serving much the same functions as its
ancient predecessor but on a global scale.
Another powerful line of thought sees it in another way.
Rather than bridging the divide between outsider and insider,
the media corrupt their discourse and drive a politically










That the media may assist in disseminating new visions and
breaking down barriers caused by entrenched misunderstand-
ings, traditional animosities and fear seems indisputable. The
problem is rather with the public. Unlike the replicants, men-
tioned in the previous chapter, with their lack of place and
history and unbound by the exigencies of locomotion, who
would like what we possess, we, in our own constant verbal
flights from our surroundings, seem intent on losing what we
have. We vanish into talk shows, reality television, and the
time spent doting on the web-sited preparations for the
marriages of celebrities. By unresistingly grasping the now-
vast opportunities offered by the media for voyeurism and
illusions of intimacy with the great, we even appear to accept
that we are nothing if not in the company of these ‘true’
human beings. What to the constant mobile-phoner is a con-
versation, and to those within earshot one half of a dialogue,
is for the phoner an escape from the space we live in and
share. It can be a life-saver in an emergency, but disembodied
dialogues are not as a rule truly dialogues. They are mutant
monologues designed to ‘fill’ time; they provide a way of
speaking to yourself that relieves you of half the trouble of
finding your own words. Here, and increasingly in public
space in general, the silences that are part of normal conversa-
tion and integral to what is imparted aloud are impossible;
the mobile-phoner’s ‘space’ has to be constantly filled or else
you have to keep on saying, ‘Are you still there?’
Some will ask, ‘Are they ever?’ In such a location-ignoring,
existence-draining form of communication the idea of
‘where’ loses all point. Some see in this the chance to establish
wider communities not bound by distance and confined to
like-minded souls, or to unite a global network sometimes










the more dust-raising spirit of a Voltaire, use the distance-
destroying capacity of the Net to collect support for political
engagement on the real globe. But as Kierkegaard more or less
remarked, what kind of personal commitment is made by
merely adding your name to a circular?2 And while virtual
communities along the information highway may seem to
herald an exciting new future, it is hard not to see this search
for new communities as due, in the words of a recent com-
mentator, to a ‘hunger for community’ as ‘more and more
informal spaces disappear from real lives’.3
It is not unexpected that the image of the ancient market-
place has been invoked. ‘The vision of a citizen-designed,
citizen-controlled worldwide communications network’, as
the same writer says, ‘is a version of technological utopianism
that could be called the vision of “the electronic agora” ’.4
The analogy is quite persuasive. In this non-space we do
‘meet’ over vast distances to exchange gossip and views.
Those over-eager to denigrate it with a ‘brave new world’
stamp might consider that the ancient agora and forum may
also have been haunted by paedophiles and their like, and
admit that in any case not all communication can be equally
edifying. It would be hard for defenders of the Internet to
deny, nonetheless, that the electronic agora offers a home to
interests and activities of a kind that, if they existed at all in
ancient times, belonged in other parts of town. Some might
even say, metaphorically, that the electronic market has
become the open sewer that in the ancient agora was chan-
nelled safely to the side, or the bawdy house whose clients
would prefer a location less open to the public gaze.
As a vast reference library, the Internet does nevertheless
allow us to gather and share information on an enormous









expansion of public space, less the public sphere as a place of
testing debate than a public space or billboard on which
messages can be hung and views pinned up for airing. It is an
almost unlimited space in which the citizen can wander at
will, diverting him- or herself with this and that, looking
forever outwards at an infinite world of facts, at Wittgenstein’s
world of everything that is the case, though on the unedited
billboard that is the Internet, there is the heavy task, so long as
there is any interest in the distinction, of singling out fact
from fiction.
One important thing lacking or liable to disappear is the
sense of presence. There are many sides to this but two are
worth noting. One is the illusion of having overcome distance.
Does distance matter? Many assume not; they are impressed
by how space can be overcome.5 But surely it does matter, and
space is not something we should gladly overcome except in
order to secure co-presence; it is required for true openness.
Not least there is the political aspect. The agora and forum
owe their meaning historically more to this than to being just
a combination of market and meeting place. As Dreyfus notes,
compared with the kind of direct and open democracy made
possible by being contained in those areas, the unbounded
electronic agora is ‘precisely the opposite of the public
sphere’. Presenting views there is nothing like participation
in a debate; one risks nothing and behaves more like a
looker-on and busy-body with no personal engagement.
In Dreyfus’s view, ‘As an extension to the deracinated public
sphere, the electronic agora is a grave danger to real political
community.’6
In fact, however, the electronic agora offers no footholds
for communal life of any kind. The fledgling public sphere of










community and in its small way was one. In this infinite non-
space there is not even standing room. You may enter an
Internet café and see people there. It is a space, but not a social
space and certainly not a communal one. The customers are
absenting themselves from each other in favour of relation-
ships thinly re-invoked when catching up with their e-mail.
The notion of space here empties itself. Not of what filled it
but of space itself. To call it ‘cyberspace’, thereby implying
that here we have not only another kind of space but one
where communal life can be reconstructed as global inter-
communication, is to invoke a myth that the reflective indi-
vidual, sufficiently outside, should have little difficulty in
exploding.
But beyond this, presence is also a condition of genuine
perception, both of what stands before you and of your own
relationship to that. The ability to work out the world from
where you stand is a pre-condition of learning to know your-
self in your perceptions of it. Breaking the circle in which the
media serve a politically passive public, so as to generate a
public debate that is critical and open, requires an ability on
the side of the public to see, and draw attention to, the failures
of judgement and openness among those who decide public
affairs, as much as it requires open and critical debate on the
part of the public.
Habermas has stressed the need of the latter. But what is
this but a proposal to revert to the situation of the public’s
origins in a view like Dewey’s in which the public is a self-
originating and self-helping organizer of its own govern-
mental arrangements? It is as if to say that the way the public
came into being is also the way it should be preserved and
constantly renewed. It implies or requires that Lippmann’s









Consequently, what is needed is not a proliferation of grass-
root debate among an outsider electorate but pressure exerted
on insiders to make their own policy-making discussions or
debates open and critical. Such pressure can only come from
outside. Certainly it will not issue from those commercial
interests that constrain even the insiders. It may need new
Voltaires.
To a politically awakening public the injustices Voltaire
brought to its notice were glaring. The truths a contemporary
must try to place in the public mind are harder to see and
sometimes as hard to accept. But if the furore Voltaire could
arouse cannot be repeated so easily today, that is not because
there are no Voltaires; the press is well staffed with excellent
writers who are perceptive critics of the political scene. It is
because, as Lippmann pointed out, the public’s mind is else-
where: efforts to enlighten it are like trying to make water
stick to a duck’s back. But if the public will not be enlight-
ened by the media, then it must be enlightened by itself,
which means by those among it still able to find the time and
space to look for themselves, in both senses, and to hearken to
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